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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER,

Case No. 20060218-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i), (4) (West
2004), and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8 (4), 58-37a-5 (West 2004). This Court has
jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was defendant—one of four passengers in a car stopped for having no front
plate—reasonably detained during the traffic stop and arrest of the driver?
2(a). Did police have probable cause to search the three backseat passengers,
including defendant, after a drug-detection dog alerted on the outside rear door
handle?

2(b). Alternatively, did police have reasonable suspicion to frisk the passengers
for weapons, given that they recovered 13 knives from the occupants, including
defendant?
The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f
11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004
UT95,1fll,l03P.3d699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4) (West
2004), possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation
of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(4), 58-37a-5 (West 2004). Rl.
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant moved to suppress paraphernalia and
methamphetamine seized pursuant to warrantless searches of his person. R41-36. Following

2

an evidentiary hearing on 9 February 2005, see Rl 50, the trial court denied the motion, ruling
that the first warrantless search was justified by probable cause to believe that defendant
possessed drugs, and by reasonable suspicion that he may be armed and dangerous. R74-68.
Conditional guilty plea. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to both charges
on 4 January 2006, preserving his right to appeal the trial court's adverse ruling. Rl 12-105,
116-113.
Sentence. On 22 February 2006, the trial court imposed an indeterminate term of one
to 15 years for the second degree felony, and a one year jail term for the class A
misdemeanor. R120. The trial court then suspended both terms and imposed a 36-month
probation term, including a 90-day jail term. Rl 19.
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on 6 March 2006. R124.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Defendant was one of four passengers detained incident to the traffic stop and arrest
of the vehicle driver. After police recovered 13 knives from the driver and passengers,
including defendant, defendant and the other passengers were subj ected to a frisk, which lead
to the discovery of a drug pipe on defendant's person. R149:6-8; Rl 50:24,27. Subsequent

!

The facts are adduced from the preliminary hearing held on 24 November 2004,
see R149 (a copy is included in addendum A), and the suppression hearing held on 9
February 2005, see R150 (A copy is included in addendum B). The facts are also recited
in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to
suppress. State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997).
3

searches of defendant's person revealed methamphetamine and additional paraphernalia. Id.;
see also Rl 50:28.
In the early morning hours of 30 September 2004, Officer Robertson of the Pleasant
Grove Police Department stopped a vehicle for having "no plate light." R149:5. As he
approached the vehicle, Officer Robertson "observed five occupants, including defendant,
who was one of three backseat passengers. Rl 50:25-26. The officer "used a flashlight to
survey the back passengers before [he] approached the driver." Id. at 25. He saw a large
sheathed knife "on one of the rear passengers." Id. at 26; see also R149:13 ("It was in plain
view in a leather sheath, fairly large knife"). After conversing with the driver and obtaining
her license, Officer Robertson returned to his patrol vehicle to run a computer check, which
check revealed that the driver's license had been "[sjuspended for drugs." R149:5; Rl 50:25;
see also R149:11. Simultaneously with learning that the driver's license was suspended for
drugs, Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, at approximately 1:21 a.m. R149:ll, 18.
While waiting for the K-9 unit to arrive, Officer Robertson arrested the driver, and
alerted a backup officer, Officer Bartell, that "there were knives in plain view." R149:14; see
also id. at 6, and Rl 50:26. One of the rear seat passengers also told Officer Bartell "that he
had a knife." R150:9. Officer Bartell said, "well, I better take the knife until we finish[] up
with the stop," and also asked "if there were anymore knives in the vehicle." Id. In response,
"[ejveryone started handing [him] knives

[E]verybody at least handed [him] one knife."

Rl 50:9-10; see also id. at 11-12. Some were large pocket knives, with approximately five

4

to six inch blades. R150:12; see also id. at21. There was also a set of small throwing knives
that were about three to four inches long. R150:12. Approximately 13 knives were
recovered from the driver and passengers and set out on the hood of a patrol car. R149:13,
21; see also Rl 50:16, 27. According to Officer Robertson, it was "rare" to find a knife
during a traffic stop, let alone 13 knives. Rl 50:32.
At 1:34 a.m., or approximately 13 minutes after it was requested, the K-9 unit arrived.
R149:18. The K-9 unit included Officer Lopez and his police service dog. R150:5. Officer
Lopez "made a safety check of the exterior of the vehicle," and then "deploy [ed his] police
service dog." Id. at 6. The dog alerted twice on the vehicle: once "on the trunk of the vehicle
on the driver's side," and once "on the driver's handle—the driver's rear passenger handle
of the vehicle, the rear door." Id.; see also id. at 7.
After the dog alerted, another backup officer, Officer Rockwood, removed the
passengers from the vehicle and frisked them. Rl 50:15-16. In the course of frisking
defendant, Officer Rockwood "found a bulge in his front [pants] pocket," and "asked
[defendant] if [he] could retrieve it," and "what it was." Id. at 17. After defendant responded
that the object was a pipe, Officer Rockwood "retrieved it out of his pocket." Id. at 18.
Officer Rockwood observed that the pipe had been "used" for marijuana. Id. A further frisk
of defendant's shoe yielded a second pipe. Id. Defendant was arrested and taken to the
police station where Officer Robertson recovered a small baggy containing 71 grams of
methamphetamine from defendant's person. R149:7-8.

5

Based on this evidence, the trial court entered a written ruling denying defendant's
motion to suppress the paraphernalia and methamphetamine seized from his person.2 The
trial court began its analysis by recognizing that police may reasonably require passengers
to remain inside a vehicle during a traffic stop, and that "a canine sniff conducted during a
[] lawful traffic stop . . . does not violate the Fourth Amendment." R73-72 (citing Maryland
v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)).
The trial court also entered factual findings regarding the traffic stop:
•

"[T]he . . . traffic stop . . . was initiated very early in the morning on
September 30, 2004[.]" R72.
"[T]he K-9 was requested at 1:21 a.m.," "the K-9 arrived at 1:34 a.m.,"
and "[defendant was searched and arrested at 1:45 a.m." Id?

•

2

"The request for the K-9 coincided with the discovery that the driver's
license had been suspended for drugs." Id.

A copy of the trial court's ruling is attached in addendum C.

3

In his recitation of the facts, defendant asserts that Officer Robertson testified at
the suppression hearing that he "requested the K-9 unit at 12:21 and that it arrived at 1:34
a.m." (Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing Rl 50:26)). Defendant further asserts in a footnote, that
Officer Robertson testified at the preliminary hearing "that the K-9 unit arrived at 12:34
a.m." Aplt. Br. at 9 n.l (citing R149:12, 18). Although there is some confusion in the
suppression hearing transcript, defendant's characterization of the officer's testimony is
itself inaccurate. See Rl 50:26 (Officer Robertson: "I requested a K-9 at 021:00 hours.
Orem told our dispatch they would respond at 022:00 hours and Officer Lopez arrived
[with the dog] at 01:34 hours"). See also R149:12 (no testimony as to timing),18 (Officer
Robertson testifies he requested the K-9 unit at "1:21 in the morning"). More
importantly, however, defendant nowhere in his brief challenges as clearly erroneous, the
trial court's findings regarding the length of the minutes long detention here at issue, or
the timing of the request for, and arrival of, the K-9 unit. Defendant is thus bound by the
trial court's findings.
6

•

"Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the actual time
length of the stop or in connection with the K-9 request[.]" Id.

•

"The K-9 arrived soon after the driver was placed under arrest in the
police car[.] Id.

•

"[I]t was dark, extremely early in the morning, there were five
occupants, two knives had already been found, and the officers were
dealing with the driver and her arrest until the K-9 arrived." Id.

•

"[T]he officers never told the Defendant that he was not free to leave,
although [the officer] testified that he subjectively believed that (which
is irrelevant)." Id.

Although the trial court recognized that detaining passengers was reasonable under
Wilson, based on the above findings, the trial court ultimately concluded that no detention
occurred here because police "never told [defendant that he was not free leave." R72
(concluding defendant "was not 'detained' for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections
to be triggered").
The trial court then entered findings regarding the frisk of defendant's person, finding
that "the K-9 unit, which responded to the scene 13 minutes after it was called, alerted to the
exterior of the vehicle that the Defendant was traveling in." Id.\ see also id. (finding that
"Defendant has failed to challenge the canine's accuracy record"). From this finding, the
trial court concluded that defendant was "properly searched incident to the probable cause
derived from the positive canine alert." R71.
Finally, the trial court made findings regarding an alternative—weapons
frisk—justification for the search of defendant's person:

7

"When the police initially approached the vehicle, they noted that one
of the occupants in the back seat was armed with a large knife." R7069.
"[WJhen the driver was searched incident to arrest for driving on a
suspended license, another knife was found on her." R69.
"After the officers requested that the passengers turn over any other
knives they had on them, a total of 13 knives were recovered, including
at least one from the Defendant." Id.
"Officer Mike Bartell, who retrieved the knives,... recovered about 12
knives from the passengers, including a set of throwing knives." R70.
"Officer Chris Lavar Rockwood, who arrived to assist Officer
Raymond Robertson, conducted the Terry frisk of the Defendant." Id.
"Before conducting the frisk, Officer Rockwood had observed 'quite
a few,' cmore than five5 knives that had been taken from the vehicle
and that they 'ranged [in size] from pocket knives to large knives.5 He
also admitted that while there had been no overt threats from the
passengers, he still had a concern for officer safety after observing the
large number of knives.55 Id.
"Officer Robertson testified that it was a rare case to retrieve 12-13
knives from a vehicle.55 Id.
"Officer Robertson... is always concerned about officer safety, though
he personally had no fear at this scene for his own safety.'5 Id.
"[T]he Court emphasizes that it was dark, around 1:30 a.m., and there
were a total of five occupants in the vehicle.55 Id.
"In sum, the Terry frisk of the Defendant did not occur until after:
a.
The driver had been placed under arrest,
b.
12-13 knives had been retrieved from the passengers and
driver, including some large knives,
c.
A police-trained drug-detection canine alerted to the
trunk and the rear door of the vehicle. The Court also

8

notes that the Defendant was a passenger in the rear seat
at the time." Id.
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that "[t]he sheer number of knives
alerted the officers that it was reasonable to conclude that there might be other weapons."
Id, Accordingly, "it could not be much more clear that the officers reasonably believed that
the Defendant and the other passengers were armed and dangerous." Id. "[Thus], the officers
conducted a proper Terry frisk of the Defendant." R69.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. The trial court correctly recognized that police are justified in detaining
passengers during a traffic stop of the driver. Thus, although the trial court ultimately ruled
that defendant was not detained here because police never told him he was not free to leave,
the trial court's ruling may be upheld on the clearly correct ground that any detention of the
defendant and the other passengers here was justified until all the lawful objectives of the
traffic stop were accomplished. Defendant asserts that the lawful objectives of the traffic
stop were accomplished when police commenced to arrest the driver and therefore his
detention after that point was unlawful. However, defendant was frisked before police had
in fact accomplished all the lawful objectives of the traffic stop; in particular, they had not
yet had a safe opportunity to search the passenger compartment of the driver's vehicle, a
search they were entitled to make incident to her arrest. Therefore, defendant was reasonably
detained incident to the traffic investigation at the time he was subjected to a weapons frisk
of his person.
9

Point II. Although defendant was reasonably detained incident to the traffic stop, the
frisk of his person required additional justification. The trial court ruled that the frisk was
justified on two alternative and independent grounds. First, by probable cause derived from
a drug-detection dog alert on the rear driver's side door handle, and second, by reasonable
suspicion that defendant and the other passengers may be armed and dangerous.
A. Significantly, defendant ignores the trial court's probable cause justification for
the search and challenges only the reasonable suspicion justification for the frisk. Where a
trial court's ruling is based on multiple independent grounds, an appellant may not obtain a
reversal without challenging each ground. Accordingly, the instant ruling should be upheld
on the unchallenged ground that police had probable cause to search defendant for drugs.
B. Indeed, although a drug dog's generalized alert on a vehicle, without more, may
not always justify warrantless searches of passengers, it did in this case because there is a
nexus between the detected drugs and the backseat passengers. A nexus exists because the
dog alerted on the rear exterior door handle, suggesting that the backseat passengers were
involved, along with the driver—whose license was suspended for drugs—in current drug
activity. The drugs also reasonably suggested that the occupants possessed the 13 knives
police earlier retrieved for a nefarious rather than an innocent purpose. The trial court's
ruling upholding the frisk on grounds of probable cause should therefore be upheld.
C. Alternatively, the trial court's ruling may be upheld on the independent ground
that police reasonably believed the passengers were armed and dangerous. As noted, police

10

recovered 13 knives from the vehicle occupants during the traffic stop; moreover, the three
to four officers variously at the scene were outnumbered by the five vehicle occupants, the
driver's license had been suspended for drugs, a drug-detection dog had alerted on the
vehicle, it was late at night, and the area was very dark. Given the totality of these
circumstances, the trial court reasonably ruled that the weapons frisk was justified, even
though the passengers were cooperative and not overtly threatening to the officers.
Moreover, given the obvious articulable safety concern created by the knives, the frisk was
objectively reasonable even if one of the officers was primarily motivated to search for drugs.
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should therefore be upheld.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT—A PASSENGER—WAS REASONABLY DETAINED
INCIDENT TO THE TRAFFIC STOP AND ARREST OF THE DRIVER
Defendant concedes the validity of the traffic stop ("no plate light") and arrest of the
driver (driving while on suspension for drugs); thus, the only issues are whether police were
justified in (1) detaining defendant—a passenger—incident to the traffic stop and arrest of
the driver, and (2) subjecting him to a frisk of his person. See Aplt. Br. at 15 ("Baker does
not dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid and that the driver was legally arrested"). The

11

validity of defendant's detention is addressed in the body of this point, and the validity of the
frisk will be addressed in Point II, infra.4
A.

Under Maryland v. Wilson and progeny, police could
reasonably detain defendant—a passenger—until the lawful
objectives of the traffic stop were completed.

Turning to the first issue, or the validity of defendant's detention, defendant asserts
that he was "illegally detained" from the outset of the traffic stop, when the driver was placed
under arrest, or "when Officer Robertson called for a K-9 unit and had [the passengers] wait
until the K-9 unit arrived and searched the exterior of the vehicle." Aplt. Br. at 15; see also
id. at 17. At the very least, defendant asserts that he was "illegally detained once his pocket
knife was confiscated, well before the K-9 unit arrived and while he was still detained in the
vehicle." Id. at 15; see also id. at 11, 19 (same).
The trial court, on the other hand, recognized that police are justified in detaining
passengers during traffic stops, see R73 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)),
but ultimately ruled that defendant "was not 'detained' for purposes of Fourth Amendment
protections to be triggered" because "police "never told the [defendant that he was not free

4

Defendant asserts that suppression is required under both the state and federal
constitutions, but he engages in no analysis of the state constitution. See Aplt. Br. at 24.
His reliance on the state constitution is therefore nominal. See Brigham City v. Stuart,
2005 UT 13, 122 P.3d 506 ("W]e are resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional
issues which have not been properly preserved, framed, and briefed"), rev'd on other
grounds, 124 S.Ct. 1943 (2006). See also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247, n.5
(Utah 1988) ("[W]e will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless an argument for
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed").
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to leave." R72. Because the trial court's initial recognition that police may lawfully detain
passengers incident to a traffic stop is clearly correct, its ruling should be upheld on that
ground.
The "touchstone" of any Fourth Amendment inquiry is "the reasonableness in all the
circumstances" of the law enforcement practice at issue. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,
411 (1997) (citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment authorizes an officer who observes
a traffic offense committed by a vehicle driver to lawfully detain any vehicle passengers until
the lawful objectives of the traffic stop are completed. In Wilson, a Maryland state trooper
stopped a speeding car in which Wilson was a passenger. 519 U.S. at 410. While dealing
with the driver, the trooper noticed that Wilson appeared extremely nervous and ordered him
to get out of the car. Id. As Wilson exited his car, some cocaine fell to the ground. Id. at
411. The state courts suppressed the evidence on the ground that it was illegal to ask a
passenger to exit a stopped vehicle.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 414-15. It held that the rule of
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) —that a driver may be ordered to exit a
lawfully stopped vehicle—should be extended to include passengers. See Wilson, 519 U.S.
at 413-15; see also State v. Shephard, 955 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah App. 1998) (recognizing
Wilson). The Supreme Court reasoned that "the same weighty interest in officer safety is
present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger," and
that the danger to law enforcement only "increases" when "there is more than one occupant
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of the vehicle." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413. Moreover, the interest in officer safety is
compelling, while "the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal" because, "as a
practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle. The
only change in their circumstances which will result from ordering them out of the car is that
they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car." Id. at 413-415. Finally, the
Supreme Court observed that Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), where police
lawfully detained eight people in a house during the execution of a search warrant, "offers
guidance by analogy, " and repeated the observation made in Summers, that "c[t]he risk of
harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise
unquestioned command of the situation.'" Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting Summers, 452
U.S. at 702-03).
Since Wilson, neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has specifically
addressed whether police may require passengers to remain inside the vehicle during a traffic
stop of the driver. However, both courts recognize that Wilson authorizes police to order all
occupants out of a vehicle "during the course of the investigation." State v. James, 2000 UT
80, ^f 10, 13 P.3d 576 ("Owing to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of the
intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle during the course
of the investigation"). See also State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100,ffi[17-18, 68 P.3d 1052
(quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03), in a non-traffic
stop case and recognizing, in dicta, that "under certain circumstances officers may detain a
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person without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the sole purpose of '"exercis[ing]
unquestioned command of the situation'").
A clear majority of jurisdictions considering the issue rely on Wilson to hold that the
same safety concerns that justify police in ordering passengers out of a stopped vehicle also
justify police in ordering passengers to remain in the vehicle for the duration of a traffic
stop.5 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 419 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Clark, 337 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003); Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161
F.3d44,53 (D.C.Cir. 1998); United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3dl0,12-13 (3rd Cir. 1997);
Carter v. State, 494 S.E.2d 108,109 (Ga. App. 1997); People v. Gonzalez, 704N.E.2d375,
383 (111. 1998), overruled on other grounds by People v. Sorenson, 752 N.E.2d425,431 (111.
2001); State v.Roberts, 943 p.2d 1249,1251 (Mont. 1997); People v. Forbes, 72% N.Y.S.2d
64, 66 (2001); State v. Shearin, 612 S.E.2d 371, 378 (N.C. App. 2005); State v. Hodges,
631 N.W.2d206, 210 &n.l (S.D. 2001). But see, Wilson v. State, 734 So.2d 1107, 1113
(Fla. App. 1999), cert, denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000).
Although the Supreme Court declined in Wilson "to go further and hold that an officer
may forcibly detain a passenger for the entire duration of the stop," 519 U.S. at 415 n.3,
courts extending Wilson generally view the safety concerns there recognized as justifying the
detention of passengers until the traffic stop is completed. See, e.g., Forbes, 728 N.Y.S.2d

5

Even before Wilson, at least one state court had extended Mimms to passengers,
including police authority to order passengers "back inside the vehicle for safety
purposes." State v. Webster, 824 P.2d 768, 770 (Ariz. App. 1991).
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at 66 ("We choose to follow the line of cases which hold that it is within the discretion of
the police officers on the scene to decide whether it is safer to have the driver and passengers
exit the vehicle or whether it is safer to maintain the status quo by requiring the driver and
passengers to remain in the vehicle until the traffic stop is over")). See also Wayne R.
LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.6(a), at 647 (4th ed. 2004) ("Common sense suggests that, in
the ordinary traffic stop situation, the officer is much better off (from the standpoint of
ensuring against a surprise attack by a passenger) if the passengers remain in the stopped
vehicle while the citation is prepared and other procedures incident to the stop are carried
out"); State v. Vandenberg, 81 P.3d 19, 29 (N.M. 20003) ("We decline to say that an
investigating officer cannot be in as much danger at the end of a traffic stop as at the
beginning, or at least reasonably believe that to be so"). Cf. Gonzalez, 704 N.E.2d at 382
(observing that, "as in Wilson, the question concerning detention of a passenger for the entire
duration of the stop is not presented in this case" and declining to express an opinion on it).
Accordingly, under Wilson and progeny, police here could lawfully detain defendant and the
other passengers until the objectives of the traffic stop—-including the arrest of the
driver—were safely completed.
B.

The objectives of the traffic stop were not complete prior to
the weapons frisk of defendant's person; thus, defendant
was lawfully detained at the time.

Having established that police could detain defendant and the other passengers until
the lawful objectives of the traffic stop were complete, the question becomes whether
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defendant was frisked before or after the completion of those objectives. As noted above,
defendant asserts that the lawful objectives of the stop were completed with the arrest of the
driver, and further asserts that the driver's arrest was completed before he relinquished his
knife to police, before the K-9 unit arrived, and before he was frisked. Aplt. Br. at 17
("Baker does not dispute that the driver was validly arrested. However, the officers had no
right to detain Baker or any of the passengers once the initial purposes of the stop ended.55);
see also id. at 11 ("Baker was illegally detained as a matter of law once the officers
confiscated personal possession(s) and had him wait in the vehicle until a K-9 unit arrived55),
15 ("Baker asserts that he was illegally detained against his will when Officer Robertson
called for a K-9 unit55), 19 ("It can not be reasonably asserted that Baker thought he was free
to leave after the officers confiscated his personal property.55). However, review of
controlling case law and the undisputed evidence clearly establishes that the business of the
stop was ongoing when defendant turned over his knife, when the K-9 unit arrived, and when
defendant was subsequently frisked. Therefore, defendant was frisked prior to the
completion of the lawful objectives of the traffic stop and his detention at the time was
reasonable.
The trial court found that police "were dealing with the driver and her arrest until the
K-9 [unit] arrived.55 R72 (emphasis added). Defendant nowhere acknowledges this contrary
finding in his brief, let alone challenges the finding as clearly erroneous. He is thus bound
by it. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 3,100 P.3d 177 ("Because defendants have failed

17

to properly marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact, we do not
consider those findings properly challenged and, therefore, assume the evidence supports
them.") (citation omitted); State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, f 3 n.l, 127 P.3d 1265
(observing "that a trial court's finding of fact is conclusive unless appellant proves the trial
court committed clear error and marshals all the record evidence in support of and against
the finding" (citation omitted)), cert granted, 133 P.3d 437. Accordingly, under Wilson and
its progeny, defendant wholly fails to establish that his detention prior to the arrival of the
K-9 unit was unlawful. Moreover, given Wilson and progeny, defendant cannot establish
that he was unlawfully detained at any time after the K-9 unit arrived, or at the time he was
frisked. As will be shown below, this is because the driver's arrest continued to be ongoing;
thus, defendant was not unlawfully detained incident thereto.
Indeed, it is well established that "when a policeman has a made a lawful custodial
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460 (1981). Therefore, precisely because the driver was indisputably lawfully arrested here,
police were authorized—as a matter of law—to search not only her person, but the passenger
compartment of her vehicle. Id. The lawful objectives of this traffic stop would not thus be
complete until both searches were accomplished. Id. And the passenger compartment was
not searched until the K-9 unit arrived. In waiting until after the service dog alerted on the
vehicle to conduct the passenger compartment search, police reasonably pursued a less
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intrusive means for completing their investigation. Indeed, if the drug dog had not confirmed
that drugs were inside the passenger compartment, the officers may well have declined to
search it and allowed the passengers to proceed on their way, so long as one of them was
legally authorized to drive the vehicle. However, once the service dog alerted to the vehicle,
the officers immediately removed the passengers, and given the fact that they had just
retrieved more than a dozen knives from the vehicle occupants, reasonably subjected the
passengers to a weapons frisk to ensure their safety before proceeding further. See Point
11(B), infra (addressing reasonableness of the weapons frisk). In sum, the arrest of the driver
was not complete until the passenger compartment was searched, and defendant was frisked
before police could safely search the passenger compartment. Therefore, defendant was
lawfully detained at the time he was frisked.
1.

Defendant's reliance on State v. Chism is misplaced.

State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, 107 P.3d 706, relied upon by defendant, is not to
the contrary. Although Chism, like defendant, was also a backseat passenger initially
detained incident to a traffic stop of the driver (following too closely), id. at \ 2, any
similarity between the two cases ends there. That is because the passengers in Chism almost
immediately became the focus of a suspected tobacco violation and their continued detention
was not therefore merely incidental to a traffic investigation of the driver, as here. This
Court ultimately held that Chism was unlawfully detained because, even after any reasonable
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suspicion that Chism and his fellow passengers illegally possessed tobacco was dispelled, the
officer in Chism continued to investigate the suspected tobacco offense. Id. at ^ 3-6,16-17.
Here, unlike Chism, the investigation remained focused on the traffic purpose of the stop,
including the driver's arrest for driving on suspension for drugs. As a result, defendant and
the other passengers continued to be incidentally and lawfully detained until all the lawful
objectives of the traffic stop, including the protocol attendant to the driver's arrest, were
safely completed. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (discussing Summers); Belton, 453 U.S. at
460.
2. Defendant's reliance on Illinois v. Caballes is misplaced.
Defendant's reliance on Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), is similarly
unavailing. An Illinois state trooper stopped Caballes for speeding. Id. at 406. When the
trooper reported the traffic stop to dispatch, a second trooper overheard the transmission, and
immediately headed to the scene with his drug-detection dog. Id. Arriving prior to the
completion of the stop, the second trooper walked his drug-detection dog around Caballes'
vehicle while the first trooper was in the process of writing Caballes a warning ticket. Id.
The dog alerted on the trunk, and the troopers thereafter discovered marijuana in Caballes'
trunk. Id. The trial court denied Caballes' motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that the
dog alert did not unduly prolong the stop and that it provided probable cause to search. Id.
at 407. Although an intermediate appellate court affirmed, the state supreme court reversed,
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holding that the dog sniff had been conducted absent reasonable suspicion and thus
unlawfully expanded the scope of a routine traffic stop. Id.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court. It held that
a canine dog sniff that does not prolong an otherwise lawful traffic stop and "that reveals no
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess
does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 410. Thus, although conducted without
reasonable suspicion, the dog sniff of Caballes' vehicle was performed while Caballes was
lawfully detained and was thus reasonable. Id. at 408-410.
Unlike Caballes, defendant does not here contend that the dog sniff prolonged an
otherwise lawful traffic stop, but rather, that traffic stop was complete when police arrested
the driver, well before the dog sniff occurred, and before defendant was frisked. Aplt. Br.
at 17 ("Baker does not dispute that the driver was validly arrested. However, the officers had
no right to detain Baker . . . once the initial purposes of the stop ended"); see also R72
("Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the actual time length of the stop or
in connection with the K-9 request"). However, as has been shown above, see Point 1(A),
supra, the driver's arrest was commenced—but not concluded—prior to the dog sniff.
Indeed, the driver's arrest was ongoing at the time of the dog sniff and throughout the frisk
of defendant's person. Therefore, just as in Caballes, the instant dog sniff occurred during
the time that defendant was lawfully detained incident to the traffic stop and was thus
reasonable.

Moreover, even if the instant dog sniff had occurred after the traffic
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investigation ended as defendant suggests, it was still lawful under Caballes because it was
based on the officers' reasonable suspicion that the driver continued to be involved in drugs.
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at408-410; see alsoShephard, 955 P.2d352, 355 (recognizing scope
of traffic investigation may be extended based on reasonable articulable suspicion of other
criminal activity). Given these circumstances, it is defendant's reliance on Caballes, not the
trial court's, which is misplaced. Indeed, the instant dog sniff stands on even firmer ground
than the dog sniff upheld in Caballes because it occurred during an ongoing traffic stop and
because it was also supported by a reasonable suspicion of another crime. Police were
therefore justified in detaining defendant at the time the dog sniff was conducted. Caballes,
543 U.S. at 408-410; Shephard, 955 P.2d 352, 355; see also Point 1(A), supra.
Based on the above, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should
be upheld on the ground that—at the time he was frisked—defendant was lawfully detained
while police completed the business of the stop.
POINT II
THE FRISK OF DEFENDANT'S PERSON WAS JUSTIFIED BY BOTH
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT HE POSSESSED DRUGS
AND REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT HE WAS ARMED AND
DANGEROUS
Given defendant's lawful detention incident to the traffic stop and arrest of the driver,
the question becomes whether police were justified in frisking defendant. The trial court
ruled that the frisk of defendant—one of three backseat passengers—was justified on two
independent grounds: probable cause to believe that the backseat passengers possessed drugs
22

based on the drug-detection dog's alert on the rear driver's side doorhandle, and reasonable
suspicion to believe that the backseat passengers were armed and dangerous, given the
unusually large number of knives recovered during the stop. R72-71; see also R150:6-7.
A.

Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling upholding
the frisk of his person fails because he attacks only one of the
trial court's two independent grounds for its ruling.

Significantly, defendant attacks only the latter reasonable suspicion justification for
the frisk on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 19 ("B. The trial court erroneously found that the
officers were justified in detaining and searching Baker for officer safety reasons" (emphasis
omitted)). His brief ignores the trial court's independent ruling that the search was justified
by probable cause. Id. at 19-24. Where, as here, a trial court's judgment rests upon multiple
independent grounds, an appellant must attack each ground on appeal or the judgment will
be affirmed. San Antonio Press, Inc. v. Custom Bilt Machinery, 852 S.W.2d 64, 64 (Tex.
App. 1993); see also James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 744 lP.2d 689, 694 (Ariz. 1986);
Shrader v. Eli Lily & Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. 1994). Thus, even if defendant's
appellate challenge had merit, it would be insufficient to undermine the trial court's ruling,
which must therefore be affirmed.
In any event, as will be shown below, the frisk of defendant's person was justified on
either ground.
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B.

Police had probable cause to arrest and search the three
backseat passengers, including defendant, after a drugdetection dog alerted to the handle on the rear driver's side
door.

Although the Fourth Amendment embodies a strong preference for warrants, it has
long been recognized that in some circumstances, uthe exigencies of the situation" can
give rise to a compelling need for prompt and thus warrantless action. For example, "[a]
warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor
committed in the officer's presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest
is supported by probable cause." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003). While
probable cause may be established any number of ways, in traffic stop scenarios like this,
it is frequently established by a drug-detection dog's positive alert. See Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (observing as part of a hypothetical discussion that "[a] positive
result [from the canine sniff] would have result in [Royer's] justifiable arrest on probable
cause"); United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 1999) ("As a general
rule, an alert from a canine with a sufficient accuracy record is sufficient to establish
probable cause"). See also Wayne R. LaFave Search and Seizure, § 2.2(g), p. 526-27 (4th
Ed. 2004) ("In light of the careful training which these dogs receive, an 'alert' by a dog is
deemed to constitute probable cause for an arrest or search").
As noted above, it is undisputed here that the dog alert established probable cause
to search both the passenger compartment of the vehicle and the backseat passengers. See
R72-71. And for good reason. The search of the passengers in this case, including
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defendant, is virtually indistinguishable from the search of the passengers in Pringle,
which case is dispositive here.
Pringle, like this case involved a traffic stop. Maryland police stopped a car for
speeding and conducted a consensual search for weapons and narcotics. 540 U.S. at 368.
The search yielded $763 from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the backseat armrest. Id. When the driver and two passengers, including Pringle, all denied
ownership of the drugs and money, all three were placed under arrest. Id. at 368-69.
When Pringle later claimed the cocaine and denied that the driver and the backseat
passenger had known about the drugs, they were released. Id. Pringle moved to suppress
the evidence against him on the ground that he was arrested without probable cause. Id.
The trial court denied his motion and an intermediate appellate court affirmed. Id. "The
Maryland Court of Appeals, by divided vote, reversed, holding that, absent specific facts
tending to show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, 'the mere
finding of cocaine in the back armrest when [Pringle] was a front seat passenger in a car
being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish probable cause for possession.5" Id.
at 799 (quoting State v. Pringle, 805 A.2d 1016, 1027 (2002)). The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id.
The Supreme Court began by reiterating general principles of probable cause.
First, that the probable cause standard "protects 'citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,' while giving 'fair
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leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection."' Id. (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1940)). Second, that probable cause is a "practical,
nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Third, that probable cause is "incapable
of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities
and depends on the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 800 (citation omitted). Fourth,
that "[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt, and that the belief of guilt must be particularizied with respect to the
person to be searched or seized[.]" Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
And finally, that probable cause to arrest is determined by examining "the events leading
up to the arrest, and then deciding] 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause." Id.
(quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)).
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court reviewed the facts leading up to
Pringle's arrest and emphasized that all three vehicle occupants "failed to offer any
information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money." Id. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court held that "it was an entirely reasonable inference . . . that any or all
three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the
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cocaine." Id. The Supreme Court thus concluded that "there was probable cause to
believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly." Id.
In so holding, the Supreme Court expressly rejected Pringle's reliance on Ybarra
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) and United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). Pringle,
540 U.S. at 372. The Supreme Court noted that it had held in Ybarra that a search
warrant for a tavern "did not permit body searches of all the tavern's patrons and that the
police could not pat down the patrons for weapons, absent individual suspicion." Pringle,
540 U.S. at 373 (citing Ybarra, AAA U.S. at 92). The Supreme Court distinguished
Ybarra on the ground that "Pringle and his two companions were in a relatively small
automobile, not a public tavern." Id. The Supreme Court also reiterated its observation
in another case, that "'a car passenger—unlike the unwitting tavern patron in
Ybarra,—will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the
same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.'" Id. (quoting
Wyoming v. Houghton, 536 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999)). The Supreme Court thus
concluded that it was reasonable for the officer in Pringle "to infer a common enterprise
among the three" vehicle occupants. Id. Given the "quantity of drugs and cash in the
car," the Supreme Court further remarked that "drug dealing" was likely, and moreover,
that it was unlikely a dealer would "admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish
evidence against him." Id.
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Turning to Di Re, the Supreme Court observed that in that case, police arrested and
searched three occupants of a car based solely on their investigation of the driver's
criminal conduct—selling counterfeit gasoline ration coupons to a police informer, who
along with Di Re, was a passenger in the car. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373. The Supreme
Court observed that "[a]fter noting that the officers had no information implicating Di Re
and no information pointing to Di Re's possession of coupons, unless presence in the car
warranted that inference," it had concluded in Di Re "that the officer lacked probable
cause to believe that Di Re was involved in the crime." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373-74
(citing Di Re, 332 U..S. at 592-94). The Supreme Court further noted that Di Re also
held that "c[a]ny inference that everyone on the scene of a crime is a party to it must
disappear if the Government informer singles out the guilty person.'" Pringle, 540 U.S. at
374 (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 594). The Supreme Court distinguished the result in Di
Re from its result in Pringle on the ground that "[n]o such singling out occurred in
[Pringle]:'Id.
The results in Ybarra and Di Re are distinguishable in this case for essentially the
same reasons they were distinguished by the Supreme Court in Pringle. Indeed, like
Pringle, and unlike Ybarra, defendant and his four "companions were in a relatively
small automobile, not a public tavern," and were thus more likely to be involved in a
"common enterprise." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373. Although police here, unlike Pringle,
were unaware of the exact amount of drugs involved when they frisked the backseat
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passengers, they knew that the dog had specifically alerted on the rear, driver's side door
handle. R70; see also Rl50:6-7. Police reasonably inferred that the drugs on the door
handle got there from the hand of someone opening the door, and that the backseat
passengers were the most likely—and most recent—people to have opened the door.
Given this reasonable inference, together with the driver's known drug history, and the 13
knives removed from all the vehicle occupants, police had probable cause to believe that
a common drug enterprise existed among the five vehicle occupants. Pringle, 540 U.S. at
373. This is particularly true here, in contrast to DiRe, because "[n]o . . . singling out
occurred." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 374 (distinguishing DiRe).
The few other jurisdictions to consider this issue have similarly ruled that a dogalert, together with information linking the detected drugs to passengers, establishes
probable cause for their arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F.3d 1507,
1510 n.l (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding passenger's arrest following positive canine alert
which occurred during consensual encounter to investigate suspected drug activity of
vehicle occupants); People v. Staley, 778 N.E.2d 362, 367-69 (111. 2002) (upholding
passenger's arrest following canine alert on passenger-side interior door panel, where
passenger was also seen visiting a "known drug house," returned to a car that was
unusually parked, and refused to make eye contact during investigative stop). Compare
State v. Wallace, 812 A.2d 291, 302 (Md. 2003) (holding "that a positive canine scan to a
vehicle's interior compartment generally, without more, does not rise to probable cause to
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search all passengers of that vehicle" (emphasis added)); see also State v. Ofori,
A.2d

(Md. App. 2006), 2006 WL 2572117 (questioning "vitality of State v. Wallace"

"in view of its heavy reliance on . . . Pringle v. State, [] 805 A.2d 1016 (2002), which was
subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Pringle").
Based on the above, police had probable cause to believe that the drugs detected in
the driver's vehicle, or on the person of one or more of the backseat passengers seated
therein, were part of a common enterprise among the five vehicle occupants. The trial
court's ruling should therefore be upheld.
C

Police had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant for weapons,
given that they recovered 13 knives from the vehicle occupants,
including defendant.

Even assuming arguendo that police lacked probable cause to arrest and search
defendant, the trial court's ruling may still be upheld on the independent ground that the
frisk of his person was justified because police reasonably suspected defendant—and the
other passengers—were armed and dangerous.
Although police may exercise "unquestioned command" over passengers during a
traffic stop, Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703), a weapons
frisk still may not be conducted absent individual suspicion that a suspect is armed and
dangerous. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968); State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^[13,
78 P.3d 590. The reasonableness of a weapons frisk is evaluated objectively, according
to the totality of the circumstances. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ 14. "To determine
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reasonableness, a court should question whether 'the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
the action taken was appropriate.'" Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 14 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
21-22). "[D]ue weight must be given, not to [an officer's] inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or 'hunch,' but to specific reasonable inferences which [an officer ] is entitled
to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Officers may
thus "draw upon their own experience and training to make determinations based on the
cumulative facts before them that may elude an untrained person." Warren, 2003 UT 36,
f 14 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). An officer's subjective
interpretation of the facts, or subjective belief, "is one of several possible articulable facts
a court may consider as part of the totality of the circumstances." Id. at \ 21. Finally,
"Courts must view the articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide
the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each other." Id. at f 14 (citing Arvizu, 534
U.S. at 274).
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances including the officers' recovery of
13 knives, the trial court upheld the weapons frisk of defendant's person as justified by
reasonable safety concerns. See R71-69. Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling on
the grounds that it "ignored the officers' straightforward testimony regarding officer
safety," and that "[i]f the officers were truly concerned for safety .. . they certainly would
not have just allowed the passengers to sit in the dark vehicle; rather, it is likely that they
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would have called for additional back-up, ordered the passengers out of the car to frisk
them, or at least ordered everyone to keep their hands w[h]ere they could be seen."6 Aplt.
Br. at 19, 23. Defendant further asserts that "the officers each admitted that the search
took place only after the drug dog indicated that he had found drugs," see id. at 23 (citing
R149:12-13, 21; R150:19-20, 30-32), and that "Officer Robertson testified specifically
that the search o[f] [defendant] was done to find drugs, not weapons." Id.
Although an officer's subjective interpretation of the facts is properly taken into
account in evaluating the reasonableness of a weapons frisk, the trial court correctly
recognized that two of three officers' subjective lack of fear did not undermine the
objective reasonableness of the frisk. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 19 (holding that "an
officer's subjective belief alone does not invalidate an otherwise objectively reasonable
Terry frisk"). Rather, the trial court correctly recognized that the recovery of 13 knives
from the vehicle occupants made this an unusual case, and in conjunction with the other
circumstances of the stop, compelled the conclusion that the frisk was objectively
reasonable. R71-69.

6

Defense counsel elicited affirmations from Officers Bartell and Robertson that
they were not in subjective fear for their safety despite recovering the large number of
knives because the passengers' behavior had been non-threatening. See Rl50:13, 31.
Although Officer Rockwood similarly testified that the passengers' behavior had not
alarmed him, he remained concerned about the large number of knives retrieved from the
vehicle occupants. R150:21-23.
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Indeed, the fact that police here retrieved 13 knives from the vehicle occupants
during the traffic stop is sufficient to distinguish the result in Warren, where the supreme
court declined to uphold a frisk, in part, because the lone officer in that case testified that
Warren "did nothing to cause [him] to be alarmed and that he had no reason to believe
that Warren was armed and dangerous." 2003 UT 36, f 32. Significantly, the officer in
Warren observed no weapons upon approaching Warren, or at any time during the traffic
stop. Id. at TJI2-7. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (upholding protective
search of Long's car, and by implication prior frisk of his person, incident to DUI
investigation, because it was late at night in a rural area and a hunting knife had been seen
on the floor of the car). Thus, in declining to uphold the frisk in Warren, the supreme
court recognized that "the case was a difficult one," in part, because it "lack[ed] the kind
of obvious articulable facts that would make the determination easier[.]" Warren, 2003
UT 36,ffl[30, 33. Given the 13 knives recovered here, this case, unlike Warren, does not
lack obvious articulable facts that make the determination easier. Id. at ^f 13.
Although the trial court properly emphasized the unusually large number of knives
recovered during the traffic stop, other factors also support the reasonableness of the
instant frisk: the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops, the officers5 suspicion that the
driver's drug involvement may be ongoing, the drug-detection dog alert on the vehicle,
the fact that the five vehicle occupants outnumbered the three to four officers variously at
the scene, the lateness of the hour, and the darkness of the area. R71-69. See Warren,
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2003 UT 36, f 32. See also United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir.
2005) (observing that "'the fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle
increases the possible sources of harm to the officer,5" (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519
U.S. 408 (1998))); United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2004) (frisk
permissible, as officer reasonably suspected defendant "involved in drug dealing59 a crime
"typically associated with some sort of weapon").
Given the totality of these circumstances, including the recovery of more than a
dozen knives from the vehicle occupants, the trial court reasonably determined the
weapons frisk was justified, even if the passengers were cooperative, and not "overt[ly]
threatening]," when they relinquished their knives. R71-69. Indeed, this Court has
previously recognized that police are not "bound to accept" a suspect's explanations or
representations. See State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, f 11, 47 P.3d 932 (recognizing
officer was not bound to accept Beach's innocent explanation); State v. McLean, 1999
UT App 114, 1999 WL 33244734, *3 (unpublished) (recognizing officer "was not
required to take the word of the driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did he have to
wait for a passenger to make a threatening move before he checked the weapons to assure
his own safety").7 Thus, police were reasonably concerned that the vehicle occupants
may not have turned over all their knives or weapons.

7

A copy of McLean is attached in addendum D.
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Finally, given the obvious articulable safety concern created by the presence of the
13 knives, the frisk was reasonable even if one of the officers was primarily motivated to
find drugs. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1135 (Utah 1994) (holding that a traffic
stop based on either an observed violation, or a reasonable suspicion of a violation, is
constitutionally justified, "despite the officer's motivations or suspicions that are
unrelated to the traffic offense."); Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ 14 (holding that reasonableness
is determined by asking whether the facts available at the time of the search would
"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22)). Indeed, it is well established that the
reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective standard. See Terry, 392
U.S. 21-22; Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). Under this standard, an
officer's motive for acting is irrelevant. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding that searches
are examined "without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers
involved"); accordBrigham City v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 12943, 1948 (2006) (holding that
"[t]he officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant"). An officer's subjective
understanding of the legal justification for acting is also irrelevant. See Scott, 436 U.S. at
138 (holding that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action
does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify that action"); accord Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (same);
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Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (same); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that "it is of no moment that [the officer] . . . did not
himself suspect that respondent was armed"). Thus, the trial court correctly recognized
that one officer's subjective motivation was irrelevant to the obvious objective safety
concern. R71-69.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Court of Appeals, 2005
UT 18, ^[ 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant
and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by
oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a).
RESPECTFULLY submitted ^ b c t o b e r 2006.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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1

Wednesday, November 2 4 , 2 0 0 4 ; P r o v o , Utah

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

-OoO-

4

THE COURT: State of Utah versus Luke Zachary Baker;

1
2

DIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. PROBERT:

3

Q

4

name.

Would you state your full name and spell your last

5

Case No. 041403985. It's No. 123 on the calendar today.

5

A

Raymond Robertson, R-O-B-E-R-T-S-O-N.

6

Jennifer Gowans is here on behalf of the defendant who is

6

Q

What is your occupation?

7

present. Guy Probert, Deputy Utah County Attorney, here on

7

A

Law enforcement officer with Pleasant Grove Police

8

behalf of the State of the Utah.

8

Department.

You may proceed.

9

Q

How long have you been a police officer?

10

MR. PROBERT:

10

A

About five years.

11

THE COURT: Come forward and be sworn, please.

Q

On the 30th of September of this year, were you on

9

12

RAYMOND ROBERTSON,

13

Called by the State, having been duly

14

sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

15
16

State calls Officer Robertson.

THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be

11
12

patrol?

13

A

I was.

14

Q

Did you pull over a vehicle in Pleasant Grove with no

15

plate light?

16

A

That's correct

17

the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help

17

Q

Did you arrest the driver for a suspended license?

18

you God?

18

A

That is correct.
What was the basis for the license being suspended?

19

THE WITNESS: Yes.

19

Q

20

THE COURT: Be seated to my left and respond to

20

A

Suspended for drugs.

21

Q

As a result of that drug suspension, did you call a

22 ///

22

K-9 unit?

23 ///

23

A

I did.

24 ///

24

Q

When the K-9 unit arrived, what did it do?

25 ///

25

A

The K-9 officer went through whatever procedure he is

21

questions from counsel, please.

|

1

required to do. And after his procedure, he told me that his

1

A

Yes.

2

dog indicated that there was the presence of a controlled

2

Q

What was found in his possession?

3

substance in a vehicle.

A

In one of his - I think his left-front pocket was

4
5

Q

3

What were you doing at the time that the officer

arrived with the K-9?

4

I

found a glass pipe that was commonly used to smoke marijuana.

5

Q

Was he arrested for possession of that marijuana

6

A

Taking care of the driver, searching him.

6

pipe?

7

Q

Had you spoken to any of the other occupants of the

7

A

That's correct

8

Q

And taken to the police station?

9

A

That's correct

knife that was in plain view, I think that's about all. I

10

Q

Did you search him at the police station?

11

think a coupie of my other partners had obtained knives that

11

A

I did.

12

were in plain view as well at that time. That's about i t

12

Q

What did you find in his possession at the police

8
9
10

vehicle at that time?
A

13

Q

14

leave?

15
16
17
18
19

A
Q

I think I spoke to one of the rear passengers about a

Had you told anybody that they were not free to

station?

14

A

A small baggy of methamphetamine.

No.

15

Q

Were you able to tell from the substance itself that

When the K-9 had hit on the vehicle, what did you

16

resolve to do about the vehicle and the passengers?
A

13

I pulled each one out individually and searched each

one individually.

it was methamphetamine or did you submit it for analysis?

17
18

A

I did what's called a field test in our police

department, which indicated a positive test, and then I also

19

sent it to the State Crime Lab which also indicated a positive
test

20

Q

Where was the defendant seated in the vehicle?

20

21

A

I want to say he was the right rear passenger.

21

Q

Did you receive a report from the Crime Lab?

22

Q

When he was removed from the vehicle, was he frisked

22

A

I did.

23

by one of the officers that were there?

23

MR. PROBERT:

THE COURT: You may.

24

A

That's correct.

24

25

Q

Was something found in his possession?

25
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May I approach the officer?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Q

(By Mr. Probert) I'll show you this document which

A

This is the findings from the Utah Crime Lab.

Q

Is there something on that document which identifies

A

Q

What does it say about the substance that you

Elementary.

submitted to the Crime Lab in relation to this defendant?
A

Q

Methamphetamine was identified in the plastic baggy;

Q

A

Are you able to identify the person that you took out

MR. PROBERT:

THE COURT: You may cross-examine.
MS. GOWANS:

MR. PROBERT:

May the record show he has identified
BY MS. GOWANS:

THE COURT: It may.
Q

Q

(By Mr. Probert) When the defendant was being

in addition to the methamphetamine that you're indicating was

Yeah. In one of his shoes,! want to say his right

in Mr. Baker's possession?

22

shoe. It may have been his left --1 can refer to my

23

report - was found another glass pipe commonly used to smoke

24

methamphetamine.
Q

Now, Officer Robertson, you recovered other evidence

that was sent to the Crime Lab, is that correct in this case,

searched, was anything else found on his person?
A

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

the defendant.

18

No further questions.

Yes.
Where is he seated?

16

It borders 300 East and 1100 North, and we were at

350 East and 1100 North.

of the vehicle that night in the courtroom today?
A

What's the address? Do you know the address of Grove

Creek Elementary School?

total weight of the clear crystals was 71 grams.

At the defendant's table.

25

We were very close to Grove Crest Elementary School.

We were within less than a thousand feet of Grove Crest

Q

21

What was there about the location of the stop of the

That's correct.

A

19

That's correct

Q

A

15

20

A

driver that made the area a drug free zone?

as relating to the defendant in this case?

14

17

pipe?

has been marked State Exhibit 1. What is that document?

A

That's correct.
MR. PROBERT:

Objection, Your Honor, relevancy.

THE COURT: It may have some relevance, but his
answer was no.

So in one of his shoes you found a methamphetamine
8

1
2

Q

(By Ms. Gowans) You didn't send anything other than

A

Oh~

4

Q

Well, the Crime Lab report indicates that you sent

three items; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

7

Q

Did you send all of the items that were found on

9
10
11

1

I

Ms. Harding?

that correct?

2

A

3

Q

4
5

6

8

I

that?

3

5

9

I

I had a measurable amount

I

You had a measurable amount
Was there more in her baggy than what you found in

the baggy that was in possession of Mr. Baker there?

6

A

There was not

I

7

Q

The same?

I

8

A

No.

A

That's correct.

9

Q

Less?

Q

On her you found a baggy of methamphetamine; is that

10

A

Less.

11

Q

Now you indicated that you decided to call for a K-9

correct?

12

MR. PROBERT: Objection. Judge -

12

because Ms. Robertson - her license had been suspended for

13

THE COURT: I'll have him respond.

13

drugs; is that correct?

14

THE WITNESS: That's correct.

14

(By Ms. Gowans) And several other empty baggies,

15
16

Q
correct?

A

That's my last name.

15

Q

Oh, excuse me, Ms. Harding.

16

A

Say that again.

Q

You indicated that you called a K-9 to respond

17

A

That's correct

17

18

Q

Did you send any of those empty baggies?

18

because Ms. Harding had had her license suspended for drugs;

19

A

No.

19

is that correct?

20

Q

Just so I understand, the baggy that was found on her

20

A

That's correct

21

Q

There was no other reason?

Is it okay to look at my -

22

A

There's no other reason.

Q

Where did the dog indicate on the car when it

21
22

would be Item No. 1430 on the Crime Lab Report?
A

23

Q

Oh, you bet

23

24

A

Yes, that's correct.

24

25

Q

So the baggy that was on her just had residue; is

25

arrived?
A

That would have to be given by the K-9 officer.
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1

Q

2

A

(Shakes head negatively).

knives that were in plain view when we walked up to the

3

Q

How long did it take from the time that you arrested

vehicle.

4
5
6

So you don't know where that happened?

A

Ms. Harding until the K-9 unit arrived?
A

Well, we used police radios to gather information.

Because of the known knife issue. We had several

Q

Where were the knives located?

A

Well, the first knife I had seen when I first

When dispatch gave the information that her license was

approached the vehicle was by the - I think it was the center
occupant in the center backseat It was in plain view in a

7

suspended, I asked for a K-9 immediately at that time. And

8

then after that time, I had walked up to the car and then

leather sheath, fairly large knife. I believe that after

9

arrested her for the violation, and they arrived shortly after

everybody was searched, there were out of the vehicle a total

10

she was placed under arrest. I think we were just looking at

of 13 knives that came out of the vehicle.

11

it I think it was just approximately 12 minutes.

12
13

Q

Q

Did you tell anybody in the vehicle at that time that

So you searched all the passengers because you felt

that it was illegal for them to have the knives?

they were free to leave?

A

No, it's a safety issue.

14

A

No, I did not.

Q

Did anybody in the vehicle threaten you?

15

Q

What was your reason for searching Mr. Baker?

A

No.

16

A

After the dog had indicated on the vehicle.

Q

Did they talk to you?

17

Q

So your reason for searching Mr. Baker and ail the

A

Did they talk to me?

18

other passengers was because the dog indicated on the car, on

Q

Uh-huh, before you searched them?

19

the exterior of the vehicle?

A

I don't understand the question.

Q

Did they say anything to you? Was there a reason,

20

A

That's correct

21

Q

There's no other reason why you searched him?

other than the presence of the knives, that you felt that your

22

A

No. Actually there was.

safety was at risk?

23

Q

You're changing your testimony?

A

No.

24 I

A

\ am.

Q

So when you searched Mr. Baker, you asked him to get

25

Q

What was the other reason?

out of the car, correct?
12

1 I
2

A

\ think it was Officer Rockwood that actually asked

him to get out of the car.

13

1
2

free to leave after Kassie was arrested, Ms. Harding?
A

Because I had a K-9 en route.

3

Q

Did Mr. Baker have any knives on his person?

3

Q

Were they not free to leave while the K-9 was en

4

A

When he was searched by me and Officer Rockwood, I

4

route?

5

don't believe there was any knives found on him at that time.

5

6

I think he had already given any knives that he had to another

6

they were free to go, and nobody asked either that they could

7

officer.

7

go.

8

Q

When did that occur?

8

9

A

That occurred while I was taking care of the driver

9

10

because I had indicated to other officers, backup officers

10

11

that had responded, that there were knives in plain view. And

11

A

Q

I don't have an answer for that. I did not tell them

From what you're telling me, because the K-9 was

en route, they were not free to leave; is that correct?
A

I did not walk up to the car and say, "You guys are

all free to go."

12 I I believe he walked up and talked to those passengers in

12

13

specific about the knives, and they gave him - handed him the

13

14

knives.

14

leave because the K-9 was en route. So from what I'm

15

gathering from that is they were not free to leave because you

15
16
17
18

Q

You don't know that he had actually had anything on

his possession?
A

Not as far as a knife goes. And I don't recall

whether he claimed one or any at all at the end.

That's not the question. You just told me or you

16

had a K-9 en route and you wanted them to stay; is that

17

correct?

18

A

I had the K-9 en route and we were still at a traffic

19

Q

19

stop. I still don't understand the question correctly. I

20

first time?

20

mean, were they free to leave, is that a question?

21

A

No.

21

Q

Were they free to leave?

22

Q

So at that time when he was searched you didn't have

22

A

No.

23

Q

When was Luke arrested?

A

I think Luke was the first one pulled out of the

23

Was Mr. Baker under arrest when he was searched the

Q

just testified that you didn't tell them they were free to

any reason to believe that he committed a crime?

24

A

That's correct

24

25

Q

Why did you not tell the passengers that they were

25

vehicle, maybe the second one pulled out of the vehicle.
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15

1

Q

So he was arrested when he was pulled out of the

2

vehicle?

3

A

After he was searched, that's correct.

4

Q

After he was searched he was arrested because you

5
6

MR. PROBERT:

Yes, Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. PROBERT:
Q

found the glass pipe?

Officer, you said to me in direct that you were still

A

Two glass pipes.

7

Q

In his pocket?

8

A

Correct

9

Q

Initially, right?

Q

Within a minute?

10

A

Right

A

Roughly, just a rough guess.

Q

It was after you arrested Mr. Baker that he was

Q

Can you be more specific about that. Did you note a

11

working with the driver when the K-9 arrived?
A

12

searched again and you found another pipe in his shoe,

13

correct, or you continued to search him; is that a fair

14

statement?

15
16

I think she had been placed in the back of the

vehicle just shortly within a minute of him arriving.

time when you had put her in the vehicle?
A

Well, my dispatch had indicated that she had a

suspended driver's license, so after that time I had - Rex

A

Continued to search.

told me that I request a K-9. After I requested a K-9,1

Q

Then when he was taken to the police department

walked back up to the vehicle and pulled her out of the

17

because he was arrested, that's when the additional baggy of

18

methamphetamine was found on his person?

vehicle, asked her to step out of the vehicle. She was placed
under arrest for driving on suspension, and she was searched

19

A

Correct

incident to her arrest at that time. You know, the time frame

20

Q

You wouldn't have found that if he hadn't been

from pulling her out and searching her and putting her in the

21
22

back of the vehicle was within a few minutes of the K-9

arrested obviously, correct?
A

23

MS. GOWANS:

24

questions, Your Honor.

25

arriving.

That's correct

Q

I don't think I have any other

Did you put in the report the time that you requested

the K-9?
A

THE COURT: Any redirect?

I did.

16

17

detained him because the K-9 hit on the vehicle?

1

Q

What was that?

1

2 j

A

What time it arrived or what time I requested it?

2

3 |

Q

What time you requested i t

3

4

A

1:21 in the morning.

4

MR. PROBERT:

THE COURT: Ms. Gowans, anything further?

5

Q

Did you have a response about the K-9 being en route?

5

6

A

Dispatch advised me at 1:22, one minute later, that

6

7

Orem City Police Department K-9 would be responding.

7

8

Q

When did it arrive?

9

A

1:34.

9

10

Q

This took place in Pleasant Grove?

10

11

A

That's correct

11

Q

I think you told me that the defendant was arrested

12

12

A

I did detain him because the K-9 hit on the vehicle,

yes.

MS. GOWANS:

Nothing further.

Just a couple of things, Your Honor, I

apologize.

8
RECROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. GOWANS:
Q

Do you typically call for a K-9 unit if you arrest

somebody who is driving on a suspended license for drugs?

13

after you had found the pipe in his shoe. I got the

13

A

14

impression from what you said to Ms. Gowans that perhaps he

14

Q

So you always do that?

15

was arrested after you found the pipe in his pocket but before

15

A

Yes.

16

you found the pipe in his shoe. Do you know at which point he

16

Q

You indicated that you have been a police officer

17

was arrested?

17

Yes.

five years, correct?

18

A

As in placed under arrest?

18

A

That's correct

19

Q

Was he placed under arrest before you found the pipe

19

Q

So you prepared a lot of these reports, I assume?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

You know that defense attorneys and prosecutors and

20

21
22

in his shoe or after you found the pipe in his shoe?
A

I believe he was placed in handcuffs and under arrest

after the pipe in his shoe was found.

22

judges rely on the information in these reports to be

23

accurate?

24

reason to detain the individual after the K-9 had hit on the

24

A

That's correct

25

vehicle, but I think you said in response to me that you

25

Q

In your police report you don't indicate anything, do

23

Q

You said to Ms. Gowans that you didn't have any
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1

you, about fearing for officer safety? In fact, if I could

indicate that the individuals were taken out of the car and

2

just refer you to the second page, you indicate at the top of

searched one by one; is that a fair statement?

3

that page that the K-9 indicated on the vehicle and

A

That's correct

4

immediately each person was taken out of the car one by one

Q

So they were actually searched because the K-9

5

and searched; is that correct?

indicated on the vehicle?

6

MR. PROBERT:

7

THE WITNESS: Yeah, I don't see the word

8

Where does the word "immediately" «

"immediately."

9

MS. GOWANS:

It's not there. Because you say at the

10

top of that page you say, "The exterior search was performed.
The K-9 indicated." And then the very next paragraph, "Each

12

person was taken out of the car one by one."

14

MR. PROBERT:

Yes, which I indicated that to you as well.

Q

In fact, all of the knives that were taken from the

vehicle were actually given to Officer Rockwood before the K-9

11

13

A

indicated on the vehicle; is that a fair statement?
A

I think they were given to a different officer,

Officer Bartell.

Ask that the word "immediately" be

stricken.
No objection.

Q

That was before the K-9 indicated on the vehicle?

A

Yes.

Q

So there were no officer safety issues at that point?

A

I believe on - no.

15

MS. GOWANS:

16

THE COURT: It may.

MS. GOWANS:

17

THE WITNESS: The report does say, "An exterior

THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you very much,

18

search was performed and the K-9 indicated on the vehicle per

19

Officer Lopez."

20
21
22 I
23
24
25

Q

Any other witnesses?
MR. PROBERT:
MS. GOWANS:

(By Ms. Gowans) Then immediately after that in the

THE WITNESS: Yes.

Ho "immediate." It says, "Each person was taken out

THE COURT: Count 1 is possession or use of

of the car one by one."
Q

No, Your Honor.
We'll submit it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. One of those has been marked.

next paragraph A

I have nothing further.

methamphetamine, a controlled substance in a drug free zone,

Right I'm not saying immediately, as in your

appears to be a felony.

report, I'm just saying immediately following that you
20

21

1

THE WITNESS: It's just Counts 5 and 6, Your Honor.

1

2

MS. GOWANS: That's correct, Your Honor.

2

3

THE COURT: Count 5, possession or use of

3

MR. PROBERT:

Just because the State doesn't have to

respond, doesn't mean that the State doesn't want to respond.
THE COURT: File your motion within -- what

4

methamphetamine, a controlled substance, a second degree

4

reasonable period of time, counsel? How much time do you

5

felony; did knowingly, intentionally possess or use a

5

need?

6

controlled substance; to wit methamphetamine, committed the

6

7

offense in a drug free zone. There's probable cause that that

7

the motion. I have a lot of scheduling issues coming up in

8

offense was committed and probable cause that this defendant

8

the next few weeks.

9

committed the offense.

9

10

Count 6 is possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug

10

MS. GOWANS:

If we could have a couple weeks to file

THE COURT: Let's set it for oral argument, giving
the State an opportunity to assess the briefing.

11

free zone, a Class A misdemeanor. There is probable cause

11

12

that that offense was committed and that this defendant

12

13

committed the offense.

13

THE COURT: Very well.

14

THE CLERK: January 5 at 1:30.

14
15
16
17

Having found probable cause, let's set it for the
next hearing for entry of plea.
MS. GOWANS:

Your Honor, I anticipate filing a motion

to suppress.

MS. GOWANS:

15

MS. GOWANS: That's fine with me.

16

THE COURT: January 5th at 1:30. I'll have him sign

17

a promise to appear in connection with that next date.
State's motion to withdraw the Exhibit?

18

THE COURT: Okay.

18

19

MS. GOWANS:

19

MR. PROBERT:

I believe under the new rule, the State

Maybe if we could go out about six

weeks, that will give us time to reply.

Yes, Your Honor.

20

doesn't have to submit anything until after the hearing, and

20

THE COURT: Grant your motion. Thank you very much.

21

so we can go ahead and file our motion and we can do that

21

MR. PROBERT:

22

relatively quickly. And the court could go ahead and set -

22

MS. GOWANS:

23

well, actually, since we've just had the hearing, I suppose we

23

(Proceedings in the above-entitled

24

could just brief it and submit it to the court and set it for

24

matter were concluded.)

25

oral arguments.

25
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P R O C E E D I N G S
—
THE COURT:

0OQ-

You may call your first witness.

MR. PROBERT:

The State calls —

I have two witnesses

in the courtroom today, Your Honor, one is Officer Robertson,
who is the investigating officer, and ITm calling Officer
Lopez.
THE COURT: He may remain.
Come forward and be sworn, please.

Raise your right

hand.
ART LOPEZ,
Called by the State, having been duly
Sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
THE WITNESS:

I do.

THE COURT: Be seated to my left.

Respond to

questions from Counsel, please.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PROBERT:
Q

Would you state your full name and spell your last

name, please.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

4

A

It T s Art Lopez, L-O-P-E-Z.

Q

Your occupation?

A

I'm a police officer.

Q

With which agency?

A

Orem City.

Q

Are you trained as a K-9 officer?

A

Yes, sir.

I'm certified in the State of Utah as a

canine handler.
Q

Were you called out on the 30th of September 2004, to

assist a Pleasant Grove officer with a K-9 sniff of a vehicle?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Where did that call take you?

A

I don T t remember the exact address.

According to my

report, it was 350 East 1100 North in Pleasant Grove.
Q

When you got to the scene, how many people were

inside the vehicle?
A

If I remember correctly, there were four people

inside the vehicle.

The driver seat was unoccupied.

Q

How many officers were at the scene?

A

Approximately three other officers.

Q

When you say "approximately,11 can you be definite?

A

There were three other officers on the scene.

Q

I think you said that the driver's seat was vacant so

that one person had been removed from the vehicle; is that
correct?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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A

Yes, sir, I believe so.

Q

What did you do when you got there?

A

I made a safety check of the exterior of the vehicle.

I do this each time before I deploy my police service dog.
Q

The safety check is to protect the safety of the dog?

A

Yes, sir.

To make sure there's no glass, metal, even

possibly narcotics outside the vehicle, also to make sure the
vehicle is turned off.
Q

Did you then put your K-9 over the vehicle?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

On the outside?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

How did the K-9 respond to the vehicle?

A

He first indicated on the trunk of the vehicle on the

driver's side by scratching.
Q

That's his indication.

How long were you at the scene —

sorry.

That's his

indication?
A

Yes, that's his first indication.

And then we

continued to search the exterior of the vehicle.

I start on

the driver's side, go around to the passenger side, and then I
go back around.

Again, he indicated on the trunk of the

vehicle; and then he continued back along the driver's side,
and then he also indicated on the driver's handle —

the

driver's rear passenger handle of the vehicle, the rear door.
Q

He indicated twice on the vehicle?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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A

Yes, sir.

Q

How long were you at the scene after the dog hit on

the vehicle twice?
A

At least 10 minutes.

We did —

my police dog did

search the interior of the vehicle also.
Q

Did you see any weapons that were taken out of the

vehicle?
A

I noticed quite a few knives on the hood of the

patrol car that was directly behind the vehicle.
Q

Were any of those taken out while you were actually

on the scene?
A

I do not remember seeing any of the knives being

taken out.
Q

Were any of the passengers of the vehicle taken out

while you were there?
A

Yes, sir.

They were all removed while I was there.

MR. PROBERT:

I don't have any further questions of

this witness, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You may cross-examine.
MS. GOWANS:

Your Honor, I don't have any questions

for this witness, and I would just note for the record that
this information isn't anything in addition or relevant to
what really happened in this case.

I also note we've already

briefed the issue.
THE COURT: Okay.

You may step down.

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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MR. PROBERT:

The State calls Officer Mike Bartell.

THE COURT: Come forward.

Raise your right hand.

Be

sworn by the clerk of the court, please.
MIKE BARTELL,
Called by the State, having been duly
Sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
THE WITNESS:

I do.

THE COURT: Be seated to my left and respond to
questions from Counsel, please.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PROBERT:
Q

Officer, would you state your full name and spell

your last name for the record, please.
A

Mike Bartell, B-A~R-T~E-L-L.

Q

What is your occupation?

A

Police officer.

Q

With what agency?

A

Pleasant Grove.

Q

How long have you been with Pleasant Grove?

A

About eight years.
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Q

On the 30th of September of 2004, did you assist

Officer Robertson of the Pleasant Grove Police Department on a
stop of a vehicle that he had conducted?
A

Yes.

Q

When you arrived at the scene, what did you do?

A

I believe at that time he had one individual out of

the vehicle.

I approached the vehicle and made contact with

the other people inside the vehicle.
Q

What did you notice when you were looking inside the

vehicle?
A
knife.

One of the rear passengers advised me that he had a
He had set it up on his thigh and just wanted me to be

aware that it was there.
Q

There were four people in the vehicle at the time?

A

I believe so.

Q

What did you do as a result of that one knife being

produced?
A

I told him that, well, I better take the knife until

we finished up with the stop.

I asked if there were anymore

knives in the vehicle.
Q

What happened when you asked if there were anymore

knives in the vehicle?
A

Everybody started handing me knives.

Q

Everybody in the vehicle gave you a knife into your

possession?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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A

Yeah.

I donft recall how many from each person, but

everybody at least handed me one knife.
Q

So you recovered 12 knives?

A

I believe so.

Q

You're not sure whether you recovered 12 or whether

ITm not sure on the exact count.

somebody else recovered 12?
MS. GOWRNS: Objection, Your Honor.
THE WITNESS:

Leading.

No.

THE COURT: I donft think it's leading.
restatement of what he stated.
MS. GOWANS:
the number of knives.

It's a

Overruled.

I didn't hear the officer testify about
Maybe I missed that, but Mr. Probert

suggested that.
THE COURT: Well, if you wish to voir dire the
officer
Q

—
(By Mr. Probert)

How many knives were taken out of

the vehicle all together?
A

I wasn't sure how many was taken out.

Q

You testified you got a knife from every person

inside the vehicle?
A
Q
A

Yes.
But you're not sure how many?
Yes.
MR. PROBERT:

Nothing further of this witness, Your

Honor.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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THE COURT:

Cross-examination?

MS. GOWANS: Yes, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. GOWANS:
Q

Officer Bartell, are you a member of the Utah County

Major Crimes Task Force?
A

No.

Q

When you indicated that one of the backseat

passengers —

is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q

Indicated to you that he had a knife, and he

voluntarily gave you that information, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Where was Mr. Baker sitting?

A

You know, I couldnft tell you where Mr. Baker was.

Q

Was that Mr. Baker who indicated that he had a knife?

A

It was, I believe, the middle passenger.

I don't

know who that was.
Q

You testified that every one of the passengers gave

you a knife?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

Including Mr. Baker?

A

If he was in the backseat, yeah, or the front.

Q

If he was in the front seat, did the front seat
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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passenger give you a knife?
A

I believe so, yes.

Q

Do you know that?

A

Yes.

Q

So you're sure

A

I got knives from everybody.

Q

What kind of knives were they?

A

Some were pocket knives.

—

I believe one set was a set

of throwing knives.
Q

So can you be more specific?

How many pocket knives

did you find?
A

I don't know the ratios of which.

Q

When you say throwing knives, can you be a little

more specific of what you mean?
A

I guess they are knives that are used for throwing in

competitions.

They're like a solid knife.

The handle is just

a solid steel or whatever it's made out of.
Q

How large were they?

A

These ones that were taken, I'm not sure.

I've seen

different throwing knives in different sizes just in stores
that I've looked at. As far as the ones I've taken
Q

—

Were they 3 inches, 10 inches; do you have an

estimate of how large these knives were?
A

I'd say about 3 to 4 inches.

Q

So they were small?
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A

Yeah, yeah.

Q

The passengers voluntarily relinquished those knives

to you?
A

Yes.

Q

You weren't aware of them until they handed them to

A

Just the one that the individual in the backseat had.

Q

Right, but with the others, when you said if there

you?

were any others, you weren't aware that there were.

They just

handed those over to you voluntarily, correct?
A

Correct.

Q

So they were all cooperative with you?

A

Yes.

Q

Nobody was threatening to you?

A

No.

Q

Nobody did anything that made you fear for your

safety; is that a fair statement?
A

Yes*

MS. GOWANS: Thank you.
THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. PROBERT:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

The State calls Mr. Rockwood.

Raise your right hand and be sworn by the

clerk of the court, please.
CHRIS ROCKWOOD,
Called by the State, having been duly
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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Sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
THE COURT: Be seated to my left.

Respond to

questions from counsel.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PROBERT:
Q

Would you state your name, please, officer.

A

My name is Chris Lavar Rockwood, R-0-C-K-W-O-O-D.

Q

What is your occupation?

A

I'm a police officer for the City of Orem.

Q

How long have you been serving the City of Orem in

that capacity?
A

Fourteen and a half years•

Q

Do you have training and experience in the

recognition of marijuana and paraphernalia?
A

I do.

Q

What sort of training have you had in that regard?

A

I've had training at post.

I've always been a police

officer in Wyoming and had training there, and just over the
years seeing marijuana and paraphernalia.
Q

Have you made previous marijuana and paraphernalia
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arrests?
A

Yes, I have.

Q

Are you familiar with the smell of marijuana?

A

I am.

Q

On the 30th of September 2004, did you stop on a

traffic stop of another officer to assist him with that stop?

A

I did.

Q

Was that in your city?

A

N o , it was not.

Q

Who was the officer?

A

The officer that was on the stop was Officer

Robertson, and he works for Pleasant Grove.
Q

When you were at the scene, did an officer obtain

knives from the vehicle that Officer Robertson had stopped?
A

Yes, they had.

Q

Did you see those knives?

A

I did.

Q

While Officer Robertson was dealing with the driver

of the vehicle, did you assist him by getting a person out of
the vehicle?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Did you pat down the occupant of the vehicle?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Was it after you had seen one of those knives?

A

Yes.
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MS. GOWANS: Objection, Your Honor.

It's leading.

THE COURT: Let's confirm how many knives he saw.
Sustained.
Q

(By Mr. Probert)

Do you know how many knives you

saw?
A

Not a specific number.

I know there were more than

five.
Q

Where were they?

A

They were on the hood of the car.

Q

Do you recognize the person you patted down in court

day?
A

Yes.

Q

What is he wearing?

A

He T s wearing a sweater with black and white

pinstripes on the sleeves, seated next to the defense
attorney.
MR. PROBERT:

Your Honor, may the record show the

identification of the defendant by this witness?
THE COURT:

Q

So noted.

(By Mr. Probert)

Who actually got him out of the

vehicle?
A

I did.

Q

How many other people were in the vehicle at that

time?
A

As I recall there was one in the front passengerTs
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seat.
Q

Luke was one of three in the rear passengerTs seat.
Did you have a concern if there are knives

—

MS. GOWANS: Objection; leading.
Q

(By Mr. Probert)

What would be your concerns if

there are knives in a vehicle?
MS. GOWRNS: Objection; leading.
MR. PROBERT:

That's not a leading question, Your

Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS:
Q

Officer safety.

(By Mr. Probert)

You patted him down after seeing

those knives?
MS. GOWAtJS: Objection; leading.
THE WITNESS:
Q

Yes, I did.

(By Mr. Probert)

What did you find as you patted him

down?
A

I found a bulge in his front pocket which later ended

up being a marijuana pipe.
Q

When you say front pocket, was that something in his

jacket or his pants?
A

No, in his pants.

Q

What did you say when you felt the object in the

front pocket of his pants?
A

Just asked him if I could retrieve it and asked him

what it was.
Q

How did he respond when you asked him what it was?
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A

He explained to me that it was a pipe.

Q

What did you do then?

A

I retrieved it out of his pocket.

Q

What did you notice about the pipe?

A

That it had been used,

Q

For what?

A

Marijuana.

Q

You can say that because of your training and

experience in relation to marijuana?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you look in his shoes?

A

I did.

Q

What did you find in his shoes?

A

I found another —

something rolled up, but it wasn f t

visible as far as like automatically seeing it as a pipe.

It

was concealed in something.
Q

What did it turn out to be?

A

I did not.

I just gave —

Did you look at that?
I think I gave it to

Officer Robertson.
MR. PROBERT:
THE COURT:

No further questions, Your Honor.
You may cross-examine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. GOWANS:
Q

Officer Rockwood, when exactly did you arrive on this
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case?
A

I was working swing shift that evening, so I just got

off at 1 o'clock in Orem, so I might have got there —
know how long the stop had been going on.
or eight minutes into the stop.

I donft

I would guess five

I don't exactly recall the

specific time or how long he had been there.
Q

When you arrived, Officer Bartell had already

retrieved all of the knives; is that correct?
A

He was in the process of doing that.

Q

Did you search the passengers because Officer

Robertson told you to do that?
A

Because of the knives I think it became a concern of

all of ours.
Q

The question is, did you search because Officer

Robertson told you to do that?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

If Officer Robertson testified at a previous hearing

that officer safety was not an issue at that time, would you
agree with him?
A

I don't know.

I wasn't at the trial.

I don't know

what he said at the previous trial.
Q

Let me tell you that that's what he said.

Do you

agree with that statement that it wasn't an issue at the time
of the search?
MR. PROBERT:

Defense counsel is testifying.
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THE COURT: State your question.
transcript here.

You know, I have a

You can point to it and read it or whatever.

Itf s here in the file.
Q

(By Ms. Gowans)

Did you search the passengers under

Officer Robertson's direction?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

So, you basically did that based on the concerns that

Officer Robertson had; is that correct?
A

I was back-up officer.

It was his stop, so he was

the lead guy.
Q

Hefs the one who said, "Go and search these

passengers"?
A
Q

Yes.
He had you search the passengers because the K-9 -unit

indicated on the exterior of the vehicle, correct?
A

Yes.
MS. GOWANS:

That's all the questions I have.

Thank

you?
THE COURT:

A n y redirect?

MR. PROBERT:

Yes, Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PROBERT:
Q

Do you know how many knives had been taken out of the

vehicle before you took Mr. Baker out of the vehicle?
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A

Like I said, there were more than five.

Not just

—

glancing at the hood, there were quite a few.
Q

Do you know if there continued to be knives taken out

of the vehicle while Mr. Baker was out of the vehicle with
you?
A

I don*t recall that, no, I don't.

MR. PROBERT:
MS. GOWANS:

Thank you.
I have a couple.

RECROSSHEXAMINATION
BY MS GOWANS:
Q

Do you recall the size of the knives that you saw on

the hood of the vehicle?
A

They ranged from pocket knives up to large knives.

When I say "large," a blade 5, 6 inches long, as I recall.
Q

Were you aware that those were voluntarily handed

over to Officer Bartell by the passengers?
A

I understood they voluntarily gave them up, yeah.

Q

Did any of the passengers threaten you at any time?

A

No.

Q

Are you aware of whether any of them were violent at

A

Not aware of that.

Q

So, is it fair to say that you weren't concern for

all?

officer safety at that point?
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A

That's a hard question to answer because on any

traffic stop a police officer is always aware of officer
safety, even if no knives are found.
Q

There was nothing about these passengers, anything

that they did or said to you, that made you fear for your
safety; is that a fair statement?
A

No, not totally because I think any police officer

when they get that relaxed then they're going to get hurt.
Q

If I can just restate what you're saying.

On any

traffic stop you feel that safety is an issue, correct?
A
Q

Yes.
But there was nothing about this particular traffic

stop, as far as anything that the passengers said or did or
anything you knew about their histories or anything of that
nature, that made you fear for your safety; is that a fair
statement?
MR. PROBERT:

Objection, Your Honor, asked and

answered.
THE COURT: Has it been asked and answered?

He said

he's always aware of officer safety.
MS. GOWANS:

But that wasn't the question.

THE COURT: What's the question?
Q

(By Ms. Gowans)

The question is, as far as this

individual stop is concerned, was there anything about these
passengers that they said that they did or anything of that
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nature, anything you knew about their histories that would
lead you

—

A

Other than seeing the knives?

Q

Right.

A

No.
MS.GOWANS:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. PROBERT:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

The State calls Officer Robertson.
Come forward and be sworn.

MR. PROBERT:

Your Honor, may Officer Rockwood be

excused?
THE COURT:
MS.

COWANS:

THE COURT:

Any objection, Counsel?
No objection.
Okay.
RAYMOND ROBERTSON,

Called by the State, having been duly
Sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Be seated and respond to questions from

counsel.
MS.

GOWRNS:

Your Honor, I do have just one quick
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question, kind of a housekeeping matter.

Officer Robertson

testified at preliminary hearing extensively on the very
issues we're talking about today.

So is he going to bring in

new testimony based on that stop?
THE COURT: I don't know.
MR. PROBERT:

I have no idea.

I've actually told Ms. Gowans about the

evidence I'm going to give Officer Robertson previously, Your
Honor.
MS. GOWANS:

What my understanding from the State is

that Officer Rockwood was going to testify.

I don't know what

information we need from Officer Robertson.

I guess that's my

question.

Is there additional

—

THE COURT: Listen to the questions and have counsel
examine Officer Robertson.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PROBERT:
Q

Officer Robertson, would you state your name for the

record, please, and spell your last name.
A

Raymond Robertson, R-0~B-E-R-T-S-0-N.

Q

You previously testified in these proceedings that

you are an officer with the Pleasant Grove Police Department
and you stopped a vehicle containing the defendant as a
passenger on the 30th of September 2004, correct?
A

Yes, that's correct.
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Q

When approaching the vehicle that you stopped, how

many occupants were in the vehicle?
A

A total of five.

Q

This was in the evening, wasn't it?

A

That's correct.

Q

Due to the number of occupants, how did you check the

number of occupants and the inside of the vehicle?
A

When I initially approached the vehicle, I used a

flashlight to survey the back passengers first before I
approached the driver.
Q

Did you then approach the driver?

A

I did, yes.

Q

You had a conversation with her?

A

I did.

Q

When you returned to your vehicle, did you run a

license or warrant check on the driver?
A

I did.

Q

You received information about her.

What was that

information?
A

That the driver had a suspended driverT s license.

Q

What agency did you contact to send a K-9 unit to the

scene?
A

I asked my dispatch if they would contact either Orem

or American Fork, which both have K-9, and they contacted Orem
first and Orem said they would respond.
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Q

How long after you asked for the K-9 did the K-9

appear?
A
have.

I would have to refer back to my report which I don't
It's on the desk over here.
MR. PROBERT:
THE COURT:

May I approach, Your Honor?

You may.

THE WITNESS:

I requested a K-9 at 021:00 hours.

Orem told our dispatch they would respond at 022:00 hours and
Officer Lopez arrived at 01:34 hours.
Q

(By Mr. Probert)

You then dealt with the driver.

I

think you testified that you placed her under arrest for
driving on suspension.

Did you then search her?

A

I did.

Q

What did you find when you searched her?

A

There was a knife, I believe.

Q

By that time that you were searching her, had other

knives been removed from the vehicle?
A

When I originally walked up to the car the first

time, the initial approach, I noticed a knife on one of the
rear passengers.

And then after Officer Bartell arrived, I

informed him that there was a knife with the rear passenger
and he approached.
Q

Were you able to see him collecting knives out of the

vehicle or were you not paying attention to what he was doing?
MS. GOWANS: Your Honor, I would just object on the
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basis that all of these questions were asked and answered at
the preliminary hearing.
THE COURT: The purpose of a preliminary hearing is
to determine whether or not therefs probable cause that the
offenses were committed and that the defendant committed the
offenses.

The purpose for this hearing goes to the issues as

it relates to the challenge or the motion to suppress.
MS. GOWANS: That correct, Your Honor.

But we did

address these issues in the preliminary hearing with the
intent to file the motion to suppress, which is why they were
brought up.

I mean, if the Court wants to waste its time

listening to the same answers and the same questions, that's
fine, but this has all been asked and answered before.
MR. PROBERT:

Your Honor, I can respond to that.

The

questions Ifm asking are questions Ms. Gowans specifically
objected to in my memoranda because they were matters not
before the Court in a preliminary hearing transcript.
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MS. GOWANS: Not these questions.
Q

(By Mr. Probert)

How many knives were in the vehicle

all together?
A

My report indicates a total of 13 knives were taken.

Q

You told Ms. Gowans at the preliminary hearing that

you believe those 13 knives had been taken out of the vehicle
before Mr. Baker was taken out of the vehicle; is that
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

27

correct?
A
Q
A
Q

Yes.
Is that actually what happened?
Yes.
After the K-9 sniff, you asked Officer Rockwood to

examine people in the vehicle; is that correct?
A

I asked him to assist on the search of the vehicle.

Q

What did you say to him about your concerns in

relation to the vehicle, anything?
A

I donTt remember specifically anything.

I think we

discussed the amount of knives that were found while we were
waiting for K-9.
Q

The knives were all taken out of the vehicle before

K-9 arrived?
MS. GOWANS: Asked and answered.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Probert)

Did you receive something from

Officer Rockwood that he had found in the defendant's shoe?
A

Yes.

Q

What did you find that to be?

A

Another glass pipe.
MS. GOWANS: Your Honor, we don't dispute the

evidence that was found on the defendant for purposes of this
hearing.
MR. PROBERT:

I don't have any further questions,
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Your Honor.
THE COURT:

You may cross-examine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. GOWANS:
Q

Just a couple of questions to clarify, Officer

Robert son.

You indicated at the preliminary hearing several

times that Mr. Baker and the other passengers were searched
because the K-9 indicated on the exterior of the vehicle,
correct?
A

Yes.

Q

You also testified at that hearing that officer

safety was not an issue or a concern as it relates to that
search , correct?
A

I haven't read the transcript.

I can!t remember the

exact question then.
Q

Would you like me to show it to you?

A

Sure.
MS. GOWANS: If I could have a minute, Your Honor.
(Pause in proceedings.)
THE COURT: Yes, Counsel.
MS. GOWANS: If I can approach.
THE COURT:

You may.

MR. PROBERT:

What are you showing him?

MS. GOWANS: Oh, sorry, page 21 of the transcript.
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1

(Witness reviews document.)
Q

(By M s . Gowans)

Did you just read where you

testified that officer safety was not an issue at the time
that Mr. Baker was searched?
A

I did say that, yes.

Q

You would agree with that now that that was not a

concern and that that was not the reason for the search of
Mr. Baker?
A

That was not —

you're asking was that a concern or

was it not?
Q

That was not the reason that you searched Mr. Baker r

correct?
A

To search for a weapon.

Q

You weren r t searching for a weapon when you had

Mr. Baker searched, correct?

You were searching for drugs or

paraphernalia; is that a fair statement?
A

No, that's not a fair statement.

Q

Why not?

A

When we are searching as police officers, we are

always going to search for anything that can harm us and for
contraband.
Q

So when you decided to have Mr. Baker searched, what

was your reason?
A

The reason for the search was, number one, the dog

had indicated on the vehicle, so we are searching for the
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contraband as indicated by the K-9.

In that search as well

we're still going to be concerned with weapons at all times.
Q

I'm not sure I'm understanding.

You searched because

you wanted to see if there was any drugs or contraband on
Mr. Baker, right ?
A

Sure.

Q

Because the dog indicated on the vehicle?

A

Yes.

Q

At that time you had no reason to fear for your

safety; is that a fair statement?
A

No.

Q

Why is that not a fair statement?

A

Just like what Officer Rockwood testified to, we are

always concerned about our safety.
Q

Okay.

But there was nothing specific about the facts

of this case that made you fear for your safety, correct?
A

Maybe I don't understand the question correctly.

Q

Are you just saying that generally every time you

conduct a search, you do it because you fear for officer
safety?
A

Yes, we have to.

Q

But in this particular case the reason that you

decided to search Mr. Baker was not because you were afraid
for your safety; is that a fair statement?
A

Yes, that's a fair statement.
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Q

The reason you did it was to search for drugs and

contraband.
A

Yes.

MS. GOWANS: No further questions.
THE COURT:

Anything further?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PROBERT:
Q

How often have you found knives in a vehicle?

A

That is a rare case.

Q

Who actually did the search of Mr. Baker?

A

Officer Rockwood.
MR. PROBERT:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

MS. GOWANS: I donft have any further
cross-examination.
THE COURT: You may step down.
Why donTt you return that to counsel.
MR. PROBERT:

Thank you very much.

Anything further?

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Submit it or argue it, what do you wish
to do?
MS. GOVIANS: Your Honor, I would submit it on our
memorandum that we filed.

I donTt think anything has changed

as far as the material facts of this case.

The officers

testified consistently that there was nothing about the
specific facts of this case that made them fear for their
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safety.

There was no violence or threats.
The passengers voluntarily relinquished the knives.

The officers didnft even know those knives were in the car,
the one that the first passenger disclosed.

But when they

were asked, they all went ahead and turned over those knives.
There was no reason even for them to have to do that because
they shouldn!t have been detained.

There was no reasonable

suspicion at that point that any of them had been or were
about to commit a crime.
It's clear and clean that the reason for the search,
the Terry frisk, if that's what they want to call it, was for
contraband because the dog indicated on the exterior of the
vehicle.

As a matter of law, that doesn!t give probable cause

to conduct a search of the passenger.

Other than that, we

would submit it on the additional arguments set forth in the
memorandum that we filed.
THE? COURT: Counsel.
MR. PROBERT:

Your Honor, there are two knives which

is what was found at the first or 13 as it turns out that there
were eventually.

The State would argue that the more knives

that come out of the vehicle, the more the officers would be
concerned about their safety.

Whether they articulate that or

not, it's a reasonable officer approach.

He viewed one knife

in plain sight on one suspect, and he viewed another knife
found subsequent to the arrest of the driver, and it was a
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reasonable inference to assume that other knives or other
weapons might be found on other passengers, notwithstanding
that they produced 12 already.
THE COURT: Ms. Gowans, anything further?
MS. GOWANS: Just briefly, Your Honor.

Just based on

the facts of this case, first of all, these were, from what
the offices testified to, in large part pocket knives and
relatively small knives.
relinquished.

They were all voluntarily

The passengers were all cooperative with the

police right from the very beginning.

There were no threats

to their safety; no violence; no indication that any of these
individuals had any type of violent history.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also indicated that the
officers have to have a reasonable belief that a defendant is
armed and dangerous in order to conduct a Terry frisk.

On

these facts, that would not be a reasonable belief that
theyf re armed and dangerous.
THE COURT: Why not?

Isnft the testimony before the

Court that this is a very rare case in the number of knives
that have been produced at this stop?
MS. GOWANS: Well, where are the fact that support
that these individuals are dangerous?

ThereTs no evidence

that any of them have or were about to commit a crime.
There!s no evidence to suggest that they would do anything to
threaten or harm the officers.

None of the officers testified
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that anything that these individuals did made them feel any
threat towards their safety.
And, Your Honor, the bottom line is the officers
testified that they searched because they were looking for
drugs, not because they were looking for weapons.
THE COURT: I thought Officer Robertson said they go
hand in hand, actually.

You donTt search exclusively as it

relates to contraband without looking for weapons in terms of
officer safety.

I thought that's what Officer Rockwell also

said.
MS. GOWANS: What they are saying is any time in
general when they conduct a traffic stop, whether itTs of Your
Honor or Mr. Probert or myself or whomever, they have a
reasonable fear for their safety just because of the nature of
what they are doing; that that's always an issue.

That's not

enough to carry it as far as the U.S. Supreme Court is
concerned.
stop.

They can't conduct a Terry frisk on every traffic

They have to have a reasonable

—

THE COURT: No, but can you point to any other
traffic stop in any case that has produced 13 knives?
MS. GOWANS: Your Honor, the other question is
what —

the officer testified that he asked if that were any

other knives in the vehicle and they went ahead and turned
those over.

What's the basis for that?

THE COURT: You haven't challenged that.
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MS. GOWMJS: That is something that we have discussed
in the brief as far as the detention.

There is nothing that

gives rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion or probable
cause to justify even asking for them to produce that, which
they went ahead and voluntarily did anyway, which shows
they're not armed and dangerous.
these facts to suggest that.

And

There's nothing here on
—

THE COURT: I will rule in writing as it relates to
the determination of facts and take it under advisement.
MS. GOWRNS: Thank you.
MR. PROBERT:

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you both.
(Proceedings in the above-entitled
matter were concluded.)
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Addendum C

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 041403985
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER,
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained
by the State of Utah in the instant case. The Court having carefully considered the Motions and
Memoranda and in response to counsels' request for a decision based solely on the pleadings, now
makes the following Ruling and Order.
L
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

The Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof on
December 13, 2004.

2.

The State filed its Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on December 27, 2004.

3.

The Defendant filed its Reply to the State's Response on January 10, 2005.

4.

On February 9,2005, the Court held a Suppression Hearing, where testimony was presented
and oral arguments were made. The Court then took the matter under advisement.
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II.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The facts relied on herein were adduced from testimony at both the preliminary hearing and
the suppression hearing.
III.
ANALYSIS & RULING
1.

Initial Detention
First of all, police officers have considerable discretion to protect officer safety, including

having passengers exit a vehicle while the traffic stop is being conducted. Maryland v. Wilson, 519
U. S. 40 8,415 (1997). This can logically be extended to permitting officers to have passengers remain
inside the vehicle during the stop. However, the litmus test for whether an individual has been
detained "depends on when the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer
thinks the person is no longer free to leave." State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655,659 (Utah App. 1996)
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, "the subjective intention of the [officer] is irrelevant except insofar as they may
have been conveyed to the [defendant]." U.S. v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 554 n.6 (1980). Such
a detention occurs when an "officer engages in conduct which a reasonable person would view as
threatening or offensive even if performed by another private citizen." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998
P.2d 274, 278 (Utah App. 2000). Hence, it is an objective test that balances the totality of the
circumstances that the alleged detainee is faced with. Finally, a canine sniff conducted during a
concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that
no individual has any right to possess, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes,

(10 7 9

543 U.S.

(2005) (Slip Opinion).

Although the time line of this traffic stop is somewhat blurry, it appears that the stop was
initiated very early in the morning on September 30, 2004, that the K-9 was requested at 1:21 a.m.,
that the K-9 arrived at 1:34 a.m., and the Defendant was searched and arrested at 1:45 a.m. The
request for the K-9 coincided with the discovery that the driver's license had been suspended for
drugs. Notably, the Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the actual time length of
the stop or in connection with the K-9 request, etc.
The K-9 arrived soon after the driver was placed under arrest in the police car; the significance
of the K-9 is discussed infra. In sum, it was dark, extremely early in the morning, there were five
occupants, two knives had already been found, and the officers were dealing with the driver and her
arrest until the K-9 arrived. Furthermore, the officers never told the Defendant that he was not free
to leave, although he testified that he subjectively believed that (which is irrelevant). Under these
circumstances, the Defendant was not "detained" for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections to
be triggered.

2.

Canine Sniff
A positive alert by a police-trained drug-detecting canine "is sufficient to establish probable

cause" to search. U.S. v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999). The only exception to this general
rule seems to be if the dog has a poor accuracy record with a history of false alerts. U.S. v. Ludwig,
10 F.3d 1523, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1993). Officers with probable cause may conduct a warrantless
search of the passenger compartment of a car, including its occupants, pursuant to the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); U.S. v. Barbee, 968
3
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F.2d 1026,1030 (10th Cir. 1992).
In this case, the facts are undisputed that the K-9 unit, which responded to the scene 13
minutes after it was called, alerted to the exterior of the vehicle that the Defendant was traveling in.
Ironically, Defense Counsel argued at the Suppression Hearing that the canine sniff is legally
insufficient to establishing probable cause. This flies in the face of the aforementioned wellestablished case law, which holds the contrary position. Because the case law is clear and because
the Defendant has failed to challenge the canine's accuracy record, the Court finds that the Defendant
was properly searched incident to the probable cause derived from the positive canine alert.

3.

Terry Frisk - Police Safety
The "danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers

in addition to the driver in the stopped car." Maryland, 519 U.S. at 414. Furthermore, "[w]here a
police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes
that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a 'frisk' or 'pat-down'
search of the individual to discover weapons that might be used against him." State v. Lafond, 68
P.3d 1043,1049 (Utah App. 2003) (citing State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985)) (emphasis
added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). An officer's reasonable belief that an individual
may be armed and dangerous is not necessarily assuaged by the Defendant's assurances. In State v.
McLean, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that the officer "was not required to take the word of the
driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did he have to wait for a passenger to make a threatening
move before he checked the weapons to assure his own safety." Id., 1999 UT App. 114 ("not for
official publication").
4
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Officer Mike Bartell, who retrieved the knives, testified that he recovered about 12 knives
from the passengers, including a set of throwing knives. Officer Chris Lavar Rockwood, who arrived
to assist Officer Raymond Robertson, conducted the Terry frisk of the Defendant. Before conducting
the frisk, Officer Rockwood had observed "quite a few," "more than five" knives that had been taken
from the vehicle and that they "ranged [in size] from pocket knives to large knives." He also admitted
that while there had been no overt threats from the passengers, he still had a concern for officer safety
after observing the large number of knives.
In addition, Officer Robertson testified that it was a rare case to retrieve 12-13 knives from
a vehicle. The sheer number of knives alerted the officers that it was reasonable to conclude that
there might be other weapons. Officer Robertson testified that he is always concerned about officer
safety, though he personally had no fear at this scene for his own safety. Furthermore, the Court
emphasizes that it was dark, around 1:30 a.m., and there were a total of five occupants in the vehicle.
In sum, the Terry frisk of the Defendant did not occur until after:
a.

The driver had been placed under arrest,

b.

12-13 knives had been retrieved from the passengers and driver, including some large
knives,

c.

A police-trained drug-detection canine alerted to the trunk and the rear door of the
vehicle. The Court also notes that the Defendant was a passenger in the rear seat at
the time.

In light of these facts, frankly, it could not be much more clear that the officers reasonably
believed that the Defendant and the other passengers were armed and dangerous. When the police
initially approached the vehicle, they noted that one of the occupants in the back seat was armed with
5
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a large knife. Additionally, when the driver was searched incident to arrest for driving on a
suspended license, another knife was found on her. After the officers requested that the passengers
turn over any other knives they had on them, a total of 13 knives were recovered, including at least
one from the Defendant. The Defendant argues that after these additional knives were "voluntarily"
produced, the police no longer had a reasonable belief that the Defendant was armed or dangerous.
However, this Court finds that such an argument fails to have any merit in the context of this traffic
stop. As a result, the officers conducted a proper Terry frisk of the Defendant.

IV.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.

Signed this

/ / -

day of February, 2005.
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evidence." Id. Nevertheless, we "review the trial
court's legal conclusions based on [its factual
determinations] 'for correctness according no
deference to the trial court's conclusions.' " Id.
(quoting State v. Yates, 918 P .2d 136, 138 (Utah
Ct.App.1996)).

v.

James Philip McLEAN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 971354-CA.
April 8, 1999.
Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for appellant.
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for
appellee.
Before WILKINS, GREENWOOD, and BILLINGS
,JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official
Publication)
GREENWOOD.
*1 Defendant James Philip McLean was charged
with Possession of a Controlled Substance
(Methamphetamine), a violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (1996 & Supp.1997). After his
motion to suppress evidence was denied, defendant
pleaded no contest on the condition he could appeal
the trial court's ruling. He now claims the trial court
erred by finding that the traffic stop that produced
the incriminating evidence was justified and that the
scope of the resulting detention was reasonably
related to the circumstances surrounding the stop.
We affirm.
We "review the factual findings underlying a trial
court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a
clearly erroneous standard," and "consider the facts
in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655,
657 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citations omitted). "Clear
error will be found only when the trial court's
factual findings run against the clear weight of the
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

" 'Although a person has a lesser expectation of
privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does
not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment
while in an automobile.' " State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Schlosser,
714 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citation
omitted)). Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment's
ban against unreasonable searches and seizures
applies to traffic stops, regardless of how brief the
stop or for what reason it is made. See Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396
(1979).
Only unreasonable searches and seizures, however,
receive Fourth Amendment protection, see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873 (1968),
and we review the reasonableness of brief
investigatory stops, such as traffic stops, under a
two-part test. First, a police officer's action must be
" 'justified at its inception,' " and second, the
resulting detention must be " 'reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place.' " Lopez, 873 P.2d at
1131-32 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct.
at 1879).
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in
finding the traffic stop was justified based on
Deputy Owen Shiverdecker's testimony that he
witnessed an equipment failure. After reviewing the
record, we are unpersuaded that the trial court's
finding that the traffic stop was justified was clearly
erroneous. The mechanic's testimony does not help
defendant because it only established that the rear
license plate bulb was operable one month after the
traffic stop. Likewise, testimony that the bulb was
working shortly after the stop still does not refute
itoOrig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Shiverdecker's testimony that he believed he saw an
equipment failure as he passed defendant's vehicle.
Accordingly, we will not supplant the trial court's
finding on this matter with our own evaluation. See
State v. Archuleta, 925 P.2d 1275, 1276-77 n. 1
(Utah Ct.App. 1996).
*2 We next address whether the scope of the
resulting detention was reasonably related to the
original circumstances justifying the traffic stop. "
When a stop is made, the detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. O'Brien,
959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (citations
omitted). During a routine traffic stop, an officer
may detain the driver to check the driver's license
and vehicle registration, and issue a citation. See id.

[protect his safety]." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923 (1972) (footnote
omitted); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481 (1983) (holding
officer may conduct weapons search if officer
reasonably believes "suspect is dangerous and the
suspect may gain immediate control of weapons").
This is not the first time we have encountered
circumstances such as these. This court recently
ruled that an officer did not exceed the scope of a
traffic stop by conducting a weapons search after he
learned the defendant had a weapon in the vehicle.
See O'Brien, 959 P.2d at 649. The officer in that
case was justified in suspending his original
investigation of an equipment failure to first guard
his safety. See id (citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 148,
92 S.Ct. at 1924).

Defendant
contends
that
Shiverdecker
unconstitutionally detained him because the officer
had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity once the driver told Shiverdecker unloaded
guns were in the car. Defendant maintains this gave
Shiverdecker no right to extend the scope of the
traffic stop to check those weapons. Defendant also
challenges the trial court's finding that Shiverdecker
feared for his safety, thus justifying the weapons
check. Defendant argues that because the record
does not show Shiverdecker had legitimate safety
concerns, no evidence supports a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.FN1

Indeed, we have rejected the notion that an officer
must convince the court he was certain of criminal
activity on the part of a defendant in order to
conduct a warrantless search for weapons during a
traffic stop. See State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866,
870-71 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). We reasoned in
Bradford that "[t]he proper standard is objective,
requiring only that a reasonably prudent person in
the police officer's circumstances would believe his
or her safety was threatened." Id. (citing State v.
Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986); State v.
Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 1983)).

FN1. The State points out that this is not
necessarily
true.
Shiverdecker,
upon
hearing the defendant proclaim that
multiple weapons were in the vehicle, "
moved back behind the rear seat passenger
to be a little more secure, and asked that
[the occupants] hand the guns out by the
barrels just so [he] could make sure they
were unloaded."

In light of the circumstances surrounding the traffic
stop in this case, we conclude the trial court did not
clearly err in finding Shiverdecker acted reasonably
by detaining defendant to check the weapons.
Shiverdecker stopped the vehicle at approximately
4:10 a.m. on a small, unlit highway near the Jordan
River. He was alone and had not called for backup.
The vehicle contained four unknown individuals.
Shiverdecker also noticed several guns in plain
view inside the vehicle within immediate reach of
the passengers and driver. FN2

Courts, however, have given broad discretion to
police officers who are concerned for their safety
while detaining suspects. "So long as the officer is
entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to
believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he
may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to

FN2. Defendant does not contest the fact
that the weapons or the pipe were in plain
view, nor does he challenge that
Shiverdecker had probable cause to search
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and arrest defendant.
*3 At minimum, Shiverdecker was justified in
suspending his original investigation to detain
defendant until Shiverdecker could assure his own
safety. See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453
(Utah 1996); O'Brien, 959 P.2d at 649; see also
Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1425 (10th
Cir.1997). He was not required to take the word of
the driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did
he have to wait for a passenger to make a
threatening move before he checked the weapons to
assure his own safety. We therefore affirm the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
WILKINS, P.J., and BILLINGS, J., concur.
Utah App., 1999.
State v. McLean
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